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STATEMENT O F TAX PO LICY
Introduction
This statement o f tax policy presents the recommendations o f the 
American Institute o f Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) for 
improving the system o f taxing corporate-source earnings. These 
recommendations are based in part on a reconsideration o f the 1975 
edition o f Statement o f Tax Policy 3, Elimination o f the Double Tax on 
Dividends, which was adopted by the AICPA Tax Division.
Statements o f tax policy are adopted by a two-thirds vote o f the 
AICPA's Tax Executive Committee, after having been initially 
approved by the Tax Policy and Planning Committee. The statements 
represent the AICPA's view on key policy issues. The conclusions 
reached in the statements are based on conditions existing at the time 
the statements are issued. The AICPA periodically reviews and, if 
necessary, reissues or revises outstanding tax policy statements. This 
study reflects the econom ic and legislative environment existing on 
November 3 0 , 1992, when the statement was prepared; this environ­
ment, o f course, can change dramatically in a relatively short time. It 
is possible that the statement may, at any given point, no longer repre­
sent the AICPA's views. Thus, the reader should check with the 
AICPA Tax Division to determine the current status o f this statement.
Historical Background
In 1975, the Tax Division o f the AICPA first studied the issue of 
eliminating the double tax on dividends through integration o f the 
corporate and shareholder income taxes. At that time, the AICPA 
published its findings in Statement o f Tax Policy 3, which recom­
mended the adoption o f an integration system that employed either 
the dividends-paid deduction method or the shareholder-credit 
method.
Since that time, the econom ic conditions and tax laws in the 
United States have changed significantly. The changes have gener­
ated renewed interest in examining the feasibility o f integrating the
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corporate and individual tax systems. Relevant changes include the 
growth o f international trade and competition, the increased use of 
debt financing, a lowering of tax rates for both corporations and 
individuals, and the inversion of the individual and corporate income 
tax rates.
During that same period, most o f the major trading partners of 
the United States have adopted some form of integration. In elimi­
nating or reducing the double taxation o f corporate earnings, these 
countries have sought to reduce the cost o f capital for domestic 
investment. By adopting a comparable system, the United States 
would similarly seek to increase the incentives for investment in the 
US. corporate sector.
The use of corporate debt financing increased dramatically 
during the 1980s. One reason for this increase is the fact that under 
the current tax system, the deductibility o f interest expense by corpo­
rations encourages the use of debt financing instead of equity. The 
rise in the issuance of debt has created greater risks o f financial 
instability. Integration would decrease the tax advantages o f using 
debt over equity, thereby reducing the use o f debt and fostering more 
stable capital structures.
Another difference relates to the changes made to the tax rate 
structure for both corporations and individuals. The Tax Reform Act 
o f 1986 (1986 TRA) substantially reduced the tax rates for both 
corporations and individuals and, for the first time since 1913, the 
maximum corporate tax rate became higher than the maximum 
individual tax rate. In the past, the higher individual rates encouraged 
corporations to retain rather than distribute their profits. Now, the 
lower maximum individual tax rate has reduced (but not eliminated) 
the bias against corporate distributions.
Several federal governmental attempts to adopt some measure of 
integration have been made since 1975. The concept o f an integration 
system was proposed by both the Ford and Carter administrations, 
but the idea was never formally included in a legislative bill. Subse­
quent proposals were included in the 1984 study Tax Reform fo r  Fair­
ness, Simplicity and Economic Growth: The Treasury Department 
Report to the President (popularly known as Treasury 1) and in the 
1985 study The Presidents Tax Proposals to the Congress fo r  Fairness, 
Growth and Simplicity (Treasury II). These two reports were the 
genesis o f the 1986 TRA.
Although the 1986 TRA did not include an integration provision, 
it directed the Treasury Department to undertake a study of different
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approaches to achieving integration. This study, the results o f which 
were released in January 1992,1 has focused further attention on cor­
porate integration.
Because of the renewed interest in integration and the existence 
of sound policy arguments in favor o f its adoption, the AICPA has 
decided to address the issue again.
Discussion
Under the current classical system, the United States imposes 
two levels o f tax on corporate earnings. The corporation pays a first 
tax on income when it is earned, and the shareholders pay a second 
tax when the corporation distributes its earnings. It is generally 
agreed that the double tax on corporate earnings results in a number 
of serious economic distortions and raises several tax policy issues: 
(1) it reduces the incentive for equity investment in US. corporations 
because o f an increased cost o f capital; (2) it favors debt financing 
over equity financing by allowing a deduction for interest expense 
without permitting a similar deduction for dividends; (3) it mis- 
allocates resources between corporate and noncorporate sectors 
because investment decisions are likely to be made on the basis o f the 
respective tax burdens; (4) it negatively affects capital accumulation 
and the savings rate, with a resulting decline in economic growth; 
(5) it encourages earnings retention at the corporate level to fund 
operations, resulting in the potential misallocation o f resources; (6) it 
lacks both horizontal and vertical equity because o f the inequality in 
the tax treatment between earnings from different types o f invest­
ment and the reduction in the progressivity o f the tax system; and 
(7) it increases the use o f tax-avoidance methods to minimize the 
effect o f the double tax, resulting in controversies between taxpayers 
and the Internal Revenue Service.2
1. The Treasury Department January 1992 report, Integration o f the Individual and 
Corporate Tax Systems: Taxing Business Income Only Once (hereinafter referred 
to as 1992 Treasury Report), recommends the adoption o f a dividend exclusion 
method. The report also recommends the long-range consideration o f the Compre­
hensive Business Income Tax (CBIT), a more comprehensive integration prototype. 
Under CBIT, shareholders and bondholders would exclude dividends and interest 
from income; however, neither type of payment would be deductible by the corpo­
ration. For a more detailed description of CBIT, see appendix A.
2. For a more complete discussion of the economic distortions resulting from the 
current classical tax system, see chapter 1.
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Given the distortions and inequities inherent in the current tax 
system, the United States seriously needs to explore the advisability 
o f implementing an integrated tax system. Integration would increase 
the after-tax amount available for investment and better balance the 
use o f equity-versus-debt financing. Integration would also make the 
tax system more equitable, and it could be expected to promote 
increased efficiencies and growth in the U.S. economy.
The AICPA has analyzed six alternative methods of integrating 
the corporate and individual tax systems.3 Each method has been 
evaluated on the basis o f whether it achieves the following five basic 
objectives.
1. Does the method lessen the relative tax advantages favoring 
investment in the noncorporate sector?
2. Does the method reduce the tax bias in favor o f corporate debt 
financing?
3. Does the method reduce the incentives to retain, rather than 
distribute, corporate earnings?
4. Does the method facilitate the interface with foreign tax systems?
5. Does the method allow for ease of administration?
Each method was also reviewed to determine whether and how 
easily it could be designed to address other issues such as the treat­
ment o f foreign investment, tax-exempt shareholders, and corporate 
tax preferences.4
This AICPA study primarily considers the three principal alterna­
tive methods o f achieving integration; the flow-through method; the 
dividends-paid deduction method; and the shareholder-credit 
method. The study also describes three variants o f the principal 
methods: the repeal o f the corporate tax; the split-rate tax method; 
and the dividend-exclusion method.
The shareholder-credit method and the dividends-paid deduc­
tion method both provide integration benefits only for distributed 
earnings. These methods can be structured to produce substantially 
equivalent tax results. The principal difference between the two 
methods is that the shareholder-credit method provides tax relief at 
the shareholder level, whereas the dividends-paid deduction pro­
vides tax relief to the corporation.
3. For a more complete discussion o f the alternative methods, see chapter 4.
4. For a more complete discussion of these issues, see chapter 2.
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The flow-through method is the purest form of integration. Under 
this method, a single level of tax is imposed on corporate income at 
the shareholder level. Therefore, unlike the two other methods, the 
flow-through method extends integration benefits to both distributed 
and retained earnings.
Advocates for the adoption o f the shareholder-credit method 
argue that it is preferable because it achieves a higher level o f com­
pliance with less effort and because it is more flexible in dealing 
with the key issues of the treatment o f foreign and tax-exempt 
shareholders and the pass-through o f corporate tax preferences. 
Those who favor the dividends-paid deduction method contend 
that it is simpler and easier to administer and that it more effectively 
deals with the tax bias favoring debt over equity capital. Proponents 
of the flow-through method point out that it is the only method 
that achieves complete integration of both distributed and retained 
earnings. However, it is the most difficult o f the three methods 
to administer.
All major industrialized countries that have adopted an integra­
tion system have opted for some form o f the shareholder-credit 
method.5 Therefore, if the shareholder-credit method is adopted, the 
United States should benefit from prior international experience. 
Also, the adoption o f this method should simplify the interface 
between the U .S. system and the other integrated foreign tax systems 
and facilitate treaty negotiations with these countries.
Recommendations
Integration should mitigate the economic distortions and inequi­
ties inherent in the present classical system. To the extent that it 
lowers the cost o f capital, it should increase domestic corporate 
investment in the United States. To the extent that it reduces the tax 
bias toward debt financing, it should help establish more stable 
capital structures. To the extent that it lessens the incentives to retain 
earnings, it should foster more efficient decisions regarding the appli­
cation of corporate earnings.
In the interest o f sound tax policy, the AICPA recommends that 
the United States adopt a system o f corporate integration. On the
5. For an analysis o f the international experience with integration, see chapter 3.
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basis o f its analysis o f the alternatives available, the AICPA believes 
that on balance the shareholder-credit method best achieves the five 
basic objectives o f integration described above. The AICPA further 
believes that it is the most flexible method for dealing with the key 
issues o f foreign investment, tax-exempt shareholders, and the pass­
through of corporate tax preferences. Moreover, administration of the 
shareholder-credit method will be no more complicated (it may, in 
fact, be less complex) than the other alternative methods.6
6. The AICPA recognizes there are significant economic issues (including the 
effect on capital markets and the federal deficit) and significant implementation 
issues (including the treatment of foreign and tax-exempt investors) associated with 
the adoption of a shareholder-credit method. Although these issues are discussed 
in chapters 1, 2, and 4, the AICPA takes no specific positions with respect to these 
issues in this statement of tax policy.
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TAX PO LICY ANALYSIS
1
The Need for 
Corporate Integration
Introduction and Background
The United States currently employs a classical system of double 
taxation on all corporate earnings, first taxing earnings at the cor­
porate level and then taxing shareholders when the corporation 
distributes these earnings. An alternative approach used by other 
countries integrates the corporate and shareholder tax systems, 
thereby eliminating or reducing one level of tax on corporate earn­
ings. Integration can be achieved either by eliminating the tax at the 
corporate level or by eliminating the tax at the shareholder level.
The Tax Division o f the American Institute o f Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) first studied the issue of income tax integration 
in 1975 and published its findings and recommendations as State­
ment of Tax Policy 3, Elimination o f the Double Tax on Dividends 
(Statement 3). At that time, the AICPA recommended the adoption of 
an integration system that employed either the dividends-paid 
deduction method or the shareholder-credit method.
Following publication of the initial study in 1975, several govern­
mental proposals recommended the adoption of some form of inte­
gration.7 The most notable were Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity
7. The Ford administration proposed an integration method to Congress in July 
1975 and again in 1977, when the Treasury Department issued Blueprints fo r Basic 
Tax Reform . Neither o f these proposals passed and the idea was dropped until 1978, 
when Chairman Al Ullman o f the House Ways and Means Committee authored an 
integration proposal (see 124 Congressional Record 2132 [1978] and 124 Congres­
sional Record 7978 p.978]).
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and Economic Growth: The Treasury Department Report to the Presi­
dent (Treasury I) and The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress fo r  
Fairness, Growth and Simplicity (Treasury II). Both reports were the 
genesis o f the Tax Reform Act o f 1986 (1986 TRA), although the Act 
did not include an integration provision.8
An integration system was not enacted as part o f the 1986 TRA 
presumably because of the substantial loss o f revenue that would 
result.9 A basic goal of the 1986 TRA was revenue neutrality; there­
fore, any provision that lost revenue had to be offset by a provision that 
raised revenue. At a time when Congress was trying to raise federal 
revenues to offset the loss created by the reduction o f income tax 
rates, many proposals that lost substantial revenue, including corpo­
rate integration, were not seriously considered for inclusion in the 
final version o f the 1986 TRA.
Some corporate managers have not favored a system of integra­
tion because of fears that integration would increase the demand for 
dividend distributions. If shareholders demanded greater dividend 
payments, corporations would find it more difficult to retain earn­
ings for financing new investment. Therefore, corporations would be 
required to raise additional funds through borrowing or issuing 
new equity.
Some segments o f the business community have not embraced 
integration because its benefits would vary substantially both among 
and within industries.10 For example, industries that distribute a 
larger proportion o f their earnings as dividends may benefit more 
from integration than those that retain a larger proportion o f their
8. Treasury I and II contained provisions allowing domestic corporations—other 
than those subject to special tax rates—a partial deduction for dividends paid to 
shareholders. However, the deduction would have been limited to dividends paid 
out of fully taxable earnings. This provision permitted corporations to make distri­
butions from taxable income first. Also, restrictions would have been placed on 
deductions for distributions in redemption of stock, including partial and complete 
liquidations. Treasury I would have allowed a deduction of 50 percent of all eligible 
dividends; this percentage was reduced to 10 percent in Treasury II.
9. Most observers agree that the adoption of an integration system would produce 
a revenue loss. The magnitude o f the loss is debatable. The 1992 Treasury Report 
estimates that when fully phased in, integration would reduce annual revenues by 
$13 billion to $50 billion or more, depending on the method adopted.
10. Integration has not been widely accepted by the business community in the 
past. Recently, however, in a letter to Kenneth Gideon, Assistant Secretary for Tax 
Policy, dated June 14, 1990, the National Association of Manufacturers endorsed 
the idea o f corporate integration.
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earnings.11 Within an industry, studies have suggested, small or 
rapidly growing firms may be at a competitive disadvantage because 
they need proportionately greater capital than larger or more mature 
corporations.
Since the release o f Statement o f Tax Policy 3 in 1975, the eco­
nomic situation and the tax environment in the United States have 
changed significantly. Some o f the major changes include the lower­
ing o f tax rates for both corporations and individuals; the inversion o f 
rates12 between the corporate and individual tax; the rise in the use 
o f debt financing; the increase in federal deficits; the repeal o f the 
General Utilities doctrine;13 the increase in the percentage o f equity 
investment held by tax-exempt shareholders; and the growth o f 
international trade and competition.14
The enactment o f the 1986 TRA created circumstances more 
favorable to the adoption o f a system o f integration. Some tax 
commentators15 believe that the flattening o f the corporate and 
individual tax rates facilitates the adoption o f integration.16 These 
commentators argue that highly progressive individual tax rates that
11. Adoption of a flow-through method of integration would eliminate this problem 
because income would be taxable to the shareholder when earned, whether 
distributed or not. However, unless a corporate tax were paid, shareholders would 
pressure corporations to distribute cash at least equal to the resulting share­
holder tax.
12. Corporate and individual marginal tax rates were inverted by the 1986 TRA. 
Before 1987, the highest individual tax rate was greater than the highest corporate 
tax rate. The highest corporate tax rate is currently greater than the highest 
individual tax rate.
13. Under the General Utilities doctrine, a taxpayer was able to avoid the second 
level o f taxation on certain liquidating distributions and sales of appreciated 
corporate assets.
14. In a speech to the National Tax Association on November 12, 1990, Deputy Tax 
Legislative Counsel Eric Zolt included many o f these factors as the reasons the 
Treasury also revisited the idea of corporate integration.
15. See, for example, Ernest S. Christian, Jr., “Integrating Corporate and Share­
holder Taxes,” Tax Notes (September 17, 1990), 1519-1526.
16. Other commentators disagree with this opinion and believe that the 1986 TRA 
actually moved toward disintegration instead o f toward the adoption o f an integra­
tion method. They believe that the change in the tax law strengthened the double 
tax on corporate earnings because (1) the maximum tax rate decreased more for 
individuals than for corporations, (2) capital gains became fully taxable, (3) passive 
loss rules for individuals were introduced, (4) the General Utilities doctrine was 
repealed, and (5) the dividends-paid deduction was reduced from 85 percent to 80 
percent. See Larry L. Dildine, “Effects on Industry’’ in Tax Reform and the United 
States Economy, ed. Joseph A. Pechman (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 
1987), 931-942.
9
exceed the corporate rate inhibit integration because higher indi­
vidual rates are not conducive to large dividend distributions.
Another change that favors the adoption of integration concerns 
the elimination of a highly preferential capital gains tax rate. As a 
result o f the Revenue Reconciliation Act o f 1990, the highest 
individual tax rate is 31 percent, whereas the maximum capital gains 
rate is 28 percent (corporations pay a maximum of 34 percent on both 
types of income). Therefore, corporations are less likely to be pres­
sured by their shareholders to retain earnings in order to enable 
shareholders to convert ordinary income (dividends) into capital 
gains (gains from the sale or exchange of the corporations stock).
Corporate income subject to double taxation was increased after 
1986 by the repeal o f the General Utilities doctrine, which generally 
had enabled liquidating distributions and sales to escape taxation at 
the corporate level. Before 1987, liquidating dispositions o f 
appreciated property were only taxed once, while ordinary dividends 
carried the burden of a double tax. This unequal treatment 
encouraged the corporation to retain earnings and invest them in 
appreciating assets before distributing or selling them in the course 
of liquidation. As a result, shareholders received more after-tax 
benefits from the corporation. However, since the repeal o f the 
General Utilities doctrine, corporations must pay tax on the apprecia­
tion in the value of assets when distributed in liquidation. This 
change enhances the case for integration, because now all corporate 
earnings, if distributed, are taxed twice.
The globalization of trade and the effects o f foreign competition 
on the US. economy together provide a major impetus for integra­
tion. When the AICPA first studied this issue, few countries had 
implemented an integrated tax system. Today, most major indus­
trialized nations have adopted some form of integration. These 
systems favor domestic over foreign investment, and they provide tax 
advantages to resident shareholders that are not available to foreign 
shareholders. Moreover, without an integration system, the United 
States does not have as strong a bargaining position in treaty 
negotiations with countries that have adopted such a system.17 It is
17. The United States has been unsuccessful in negotiating any integration benefits 
for U.S. shareholders under its tax treaties with Germany and Italy. These countries 
implemented integration systems in 1977, and new tax treaties went into effect in 
1991 and 1985. In contrast, in its tax treaties with the United Kingdom and France, 
the United States has obtained some integration benefits for U.S. shareholders. See 
appendix B for further information. Also, see Richard L. Doernberg, “International 
Aspects o f Individual and Corporate Tax Integration,” Tax Notes International 
(March 16, 1992), 535-544.
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very difficult to convince foreign countries to extend integration 
benefits to U.S. shareholders when the United States cannot offer 
similar benefits to foreign-country residents who invest in U.S. 
corporations.
In addition, the double tax on corporate earnings increases the 
cost o f capital,18 making investment by foreign taxpayers in the United 
States less attractive than investment in countries that have a lower 
cost o f capital. Therefore, the adoption o f an integration system can 
be expected to improve the competitive position o f the United States 
in global financial markets and increase foreign investment in the 
United States.19
The deductibility o f interest expense under the current tax sys­
tem encourages the use of debt financing over equity.20 This tax bias
18. Interest rates, the inflation rate, economic depreciation, and taxes levied on 
income from the investment are all factors affecting the cost of capital for a specific 
venture. Lower capital costs stimulate economic growth and savings. Several recent 
studies show that the cost o f capital in the United States is higher than that of 
several o f its trading partners, thus making it difficult to be competitive. See Charls 
E. Walker and Mark A. Bloomfield, “The Case for the Restoration of a Capital Gains 
Tax Differential,” Tax Notes (May 2 2 , 1989), 1019-1029, and Dan Cordiz and James 
Srodes, “A Memo to Congress,” Financial World (December 26, 1989), 22-27.
19. There appears to be no empirical evidence to support the conclusion that adop­
tion of an integration system would in fact improve the United States’ competitive 
position. Nor can the experiences o f other countries in adopting such a system be 
relied upon, because their economies have continued to be affected by many other 
business and social factors. However, the economic model used in the 1992 Treasury 
Report indicates that integration will have a positive, although possibly a limited, 
effect on foreign investment in the United States and on U.S. investment abroad.
20. On a number of occasions in recent years, Congress has attempted to reduce 
the erosion of the corporate tax base by limiting the deduction of interest expense. 
(There are other provisions, not relevant here, that have also put significant restric­
tions on interest deductions by individual taxpayers.) Taken as a whole, these 
attempts appear to be a piecemeal approach to neutralizing debt-versus-equity 
differences.
The enactment of Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 864(e) by the 1986 TRA 
significantly limited interest deductions. This section requires U.S. taxpayers to 
allocate and apportion interest expense when determining foreign-source taxable 
income. The effect is to reduce the current benefit of foreign tax credits, thus 
increasing the double taxation o f corporate earnings by U.S. and foreign jurisdic­
tions and reducing the competitiveness o f U.S. companies in the global economy. 
In 1989, several additional amendments to the IRC were made that deferred or 
denied the tax benefit o f interest expense. These amendments include IRC Sec­
tions 163(e)(5), 163(i), and 163(j), which relate to the deferral or denial of interest 
on certain high-yield original-issue discount debt obligations and certain interest 
paid by corporations to related parties.
Other sections that reduce the amount of interest allowed include IRC Section 279 
(corporate interest expense incurred to acquire stock or assets in certain circum­
stances), IRC Section 246A (interest expense incurred to finance portfolio stock), 
and IRC Section 265(a)(2) (interest expense incurred to purchase tax-exempt 
obligations).
11
has resulted in the increased use of borrowing, which has both 
eroded the corporate tax base and heightened the risks associated 
with financial instability.21 Many bankruptcy-prediction studies have 
found that a high debt-to-equity ratio contributes significantly to cor­
porate failure.22 Since many forms of integration would reduce the 
relative tax advantages of debt financing, the use of debt should 
decrease, expanding the corporate tax base and fostering more stable 
capital structures.
A Review of the Current System
Three rationales for the current double-tax system have been 
offered: first, that the corporation and its owners have separate utility 
functions that can be exercised independendy;23 second, that the 
corporation is a more efficient producer that creates surplus profits 
that should be taxed;24 and third, that a corporate tax is needed to 
safeguard the individual income tax.25
The first rationale justifies the imposition of a two-tier tax on the 
grounds that the corporation and all o f its owners have an indepen­
dent ability to exercise power over their incomes. This argument, 
called the power rationale, relies for its support on horizontal equity 
principles26 and the definition o f a taxable unit. According to this 
rationale, the corporation and its owners are considered separate eco­
nomic units, each o f which has the power to exercise savings and con­
sumption decisions over its own income. Since all parties have the 
power to make such decisions, each should be taxed.
The second rationale assumes that the corporate structure 
produces efficiencies resulting in surplus profits that should be taxed. 
This assumption is based on the theory that a corporations manage-
21. See Willard Taylor and Bernard Aidinoff, “Approaches to Debt: Is Integration 
the Answer?” Taxes (December 1989), 931-942.
22. See Geraldine Gerardi et al., “Gorporate Integration Puzzles,” National Tax 
Journal 43 (September 1990), 307-314.
23. See Rebecca S. Rudnick, “Corporate Tax Integration: Liquidity of Investment,” 
Tax Notes (February 27, 1989), 1107-U23.
24. Ibid.
25. See Joseph A. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy, 5th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brook­
ings Institution, 1987).
26. A system is horizontally equitable if taxpayers with equal incomes pay an equal 
amount of tax.
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ment, economic size, and access to capital markets enable it to pro­
duce profits in excess o f profits available to individual shareholders. 
Two levels o f tax should result because corporations can generate 
larger amounts o f income.
The possibility that all levels o f taxation on corporate income may 
be avoided provides the third rationale. If corporations are not 
separately taxed, individual shareholders can avoid the individual 
income tax by accumulating income at the corporate level. Imposi­
tion o f a separate tax on corporations may provide the best way to 
ensure that all income will be taxed at least once.
Although the classical system can be defended, the double taxa­
tion o f corporate income produces a number of serious economic dis­
tortions and raises several tax policy questions. A discussion of some 
o f the major problems caused by the double taxation under the pres­
ent system follows.
Missed Opportunities for the 
United States
Currently, the failure o f the United States to adopt tax integration 
discourages foreign investment in domestic corporations because the 
double taxation o f corporate earnings decreases the return on cor­
porate investment. In recent years, the cost o f capital in the United 
States has been among the highest in the industrialized world,27 
making investment in the United States relatively less attractive than 
investment in countries that have a lower cost o f capital.
Additionally, most countries with an integrated system encourage 
residents to invest within the country by granting integration benefits 
only to investments in domestic corporations. In limiting benefits to 
domestic earnings and to resident shareholders, an integration sys­
tem may be viewed as protectionist. Foreign investment in domestic 
corporations can be encouraged when the benefits of integration are 
extended to foreign shareholders.28
The United States, the only major industrialized nation that has 
not adopted integration, may be at a disadvantage in world markets
27. See Walker and Bloomfield, “The Case for the Restoration of a Capital Gains 
Tax Differential,” 1019-1029.
28. See Steven C. Wrappe, “The Protectionist Potential o f the Imputation Form of 
Corporate Integration,” Tax Notes (May 7, 1990), 727-731. See also Hugh J. Ault, 
“Corporate Integration and Tax Treaties: Where Do We Go From Here?” Tax Notes 
International (March 16, 1992), 545-548.
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because of its higher cost o f capital. By adopting an integration sys­
tem, the United States will increase the after-tax return on corporate 
capital and, therefore, will be more competitive in attracting foreign 
investment.
Without integration, the United States is also at a disadvantage in 
treaty negotiations, since this country cannot offer the same benefits 
to foreign investors that other countries can extend to US. residents. 
Because the United States does not provide comparable credit for 
dividends, foreign countries are not as willing to extend their integra­
tion benefits to US. investors.
Debt Versus Equity
The current system allows a corporation a deduction for interest 
while not permitting a deduction for the payment of dividends. This 
difference in tax treatment between debt and equity can produce a 
distortion in a corporation's capitalization, investment, and distribu­
tion policies. The reduced after-tax cost o f debt financing encourages 
corporations to finance their operations through the use o f debt. This 
increased use of debt requires corporations to meet higher fixed 
charges for interest and principal. Therefore, such higher debt-to- 
equity ratios increase the possibility o f financial distress.
Misallocation Between Corporate 
and Noncorporate Sectors
A system that levies a double tax on only one source of income 
creates an economic distortion because investment decisions may be 
altered on the basis o f the tax burden.29 Some economists suggest 
that the amount of tax liability should be no more than a small 
determinant in the decision to invest in certain types o f economic 
activity.30 Taxing corporate earnings twice lowers the after-tax return
29. See Gerardi et al., “Corporate Integration Puzzles,” 308. See also Ernest S. 
Christian, Jr., “Integrating the Corporate Tax: Methods, Motivations and Effects,” in 
Tax Policy Study fo r  AEI (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977).
30. Economic investment decisions should be evaluated on the basis of their merit, 
not on the basis o f the tax advantages the investment will produce. When invest­
ments are driven primarily by tax consequences, resources are not used efficiently. 
See Eugene Steurle, “Effects on Financial Decisionmaking,” in Tax Reform and the 
United States Economy, ed. Joseph A. Pechman (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Insti­
tution, 1987), 55-70.
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to investors. Therefore, the cost o f capital in the corporate sector is 
greater than in the noncorporate sector.31
As investors seek to maximize after-tax return on capital, they may 
shift their investments from the corporate sector to the noncorporate 
sector. This shift may result in a lower return from any given amount 
of capital, thereby decreasing overall economic output. In addition, 
the current system discourages capital-intensive investment, since 
such activities must be conducted in corporate form because o f the 
large financing requirements. Because of the high cost o f capital, 
investors may be inclined to reallocate their funds from capital- 
intensive industries to industries such as domestic trade and service.32 
These investment decisions create a less than optimal situation 
because capital is not being utilized to its highest potential.
Negative Effect on Capital Accumulation
Economists stress the importance of capital accumulation in a 
country’s economic growth. The double tax on corporate earnings 
negatively affects capital accumulation and economic growth by 
limiting the savings rate.33 The average growth and savings rates in the 
United States are lower than in most other industrialized nations.34 
This difference may be partly attributable to the present tax system 
since the double tax increases the tax burden on corporate income 
and thus reduces the rate o f return on investment in the corporate 
sector. Studies have shown that lower rates o f return inhibit savings
31. Investors consider all costs of a particular venture when making investment 
decisions. The combination o f all financial and tax costs determines the overall cost 
of capital.
32. The 1986 TRA increased corporate tax burdens more than it increased the tax 
burdens on noncorporate businesses. This increase adds to the bias against the use 
of corporations. However, on average, domestic trade and service businesses will 
have a direct tax reduction because these industries generally receive more 
benefits from the rate reduction than the broadened tax-base costs. Therefore, 
many investors may shift to these sectors. See Dildine, “Effects on Industry” in Tax 
Refo rm and the United States Economy, 941-942.
33. See Jane G. Gravelle, “Corporate Tax Integration; Issues and Opinions,” CRS 
Report fo r Congress (June 14, 1991), 1-57.
34. See Walker and Bloomfield, “The Case for the Restoration of a Capital Gains 
Tax Differential,” 1019-1029.
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and investment.35 Therefore, investors ignore many new and innova­
tive ventures because the risks involved exceed the expected return. 
This misallocation o f resources distorts investment decisions and 
limits economic growth.
Earnings Retention at the Corporate Level
Under the present classical system, corporations are encouraged 
to retain earnings and thereby avoid a second level o f tax until distri­
butions are made. Therefore, corporations have an incentive to fund 
operations with retained earnings rather than to issue additional 
equity. The retention o f earnings precludes shareholders from mak­
ing independent investment decisions about these earnings, which 
may result in a misallocation of resources.
The 1986 TRA reduced the advantages of corporate earnings 
retention by repealing the General Utilities doctrine.36 Nevertheless, 
since the double tax on liquidation is still deferred until a future date, 
corporations and their shareholders may continue to favor reten­
tion o f assets over current distributions because of the time value 
of money.
Lack of Horizontal Equity
Horizontal equity exists when taxpayers with equal incomes pay 
an equal amount of tax. The 1986 TRA reduced the horizontal
35. See Gerardi et al., “Corporate Integration Puzzles,” 309. See studies that sug­
gest that aggregate investment is quite sensitive to tax changes—for example, 
Robert E. Hall and Dale W. Jorgenson, “Tax Policy and Investment Behavior," 
American Economic Review 57 (June 1967), 391-414, and Martin S. Feldstein and 
Joonsung Jun, “The Effects o f Tax Rules on Nonresidential Fixed Investment: Some 
Preliminary Evidence from the 1980’s,” in The Effects o f Taxation on Capital 
Accumulation, ed. M. Feldstein (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
36. The erosion of the General Utilities doctrine occurred through a series o f legis­
lative changes spanning many years. IRC Section 311(d), added by the Tax Reform 
Act o f 1969, required corporate-level gain recognition on distributions of 
appreciated property in redemption of stock. Exceptions to this rule included, 
among others, distributions in complete termination of certain 10 percent-or- 
greater shareholders and distribution o f stock or obligations to pay death taxes 
under IRC Section 303. Beginning in 1982, most distributions in partial liquidation 
resulted in gain recognition. The 1984 Tax Reform Act repealed the corporate 
nonrecognition rule with respect to nonliquidating distributions of appreciated 
property. The 1986 TRA completely repealed the General Utilities doctrine by 
requiring corporations to recognize gain or loss on sales or distributions made 
pursuant to a complete liquidation.
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inequity o f the then-current system.37 However, some inequity 
remains because the double tax on corporate earnings causes share­
holders to effectively pay more tax than do investors in the noncor­
porate sector. This double tax also creates an inequality in the tax 
treatment between earnings from equity investments and other 
sources o f income such as interest and wages.
Lack of Vertical Equity
Vertical equity compares the ability of each taxpayer to pay taxes 
with the actual tax liability o f that taxpayer. This principle is satisfied 
when taxpayers with greater financial resources pay a larger portion 
of the aggregate tax burden. Therefore, a progressive tax system 
produces a greater level o f vertical equity. Under the current system, 
however, the effective tax rate on corporate earnings for a shareholder 
in the lower tax brackets increases more rapidly than the rate for a 
shareholder in the higher brackets. This effect reduces the progres­
sivity o f the tax system, directly conflicting with the objectives o f ver­
tical equity.38
Tax Avoidance
Corporate earnings are the only source of income that bears the 
burden o f double taxation. To avoid this inequity, corporations have
37. By eliminating many loopholes and tax advantages and broadening the tax base, 
more types of income are taxed equally, helping to produce horizontal equity.
38. This result produced by the current system is best illustrated by comparing the 
effective tax rate imposed on distributed earnings received by a shareholder in the 
15 percent tax bracket with that imposed on a shareholder in the 31 percent tax 
bracket in both a double-level tax system and an integrated tax system.
Assuming a 34 percent corporate tax rate, a corporation with $1,000 taxable income 
pays $340 in income tax. If the remaining $660 is paid to the shareholder as a divi­
dend, the 15 percent shareholder pays income taxes on this amount of $99. This 
results in an effective tax rate o f 43.9 percent (corporate tax of $340 plus individual 
tax of $99 divided by pretax corporate income of $1,000). In comparison, the 31 per­
cent tax bracket shareholder pays income taxes of $205 on the dividend income. 
The effective tax rate for this shareholder is 54.5 percent ($340 in corporate tax plus 
$205 in individual tax divided by $1,000 corporate taxable income).
To summarize, the higher tax bracket shareholder's effective tax rate on distributed 
earnings is only 24.1 percent higher than the comparable rate for the lower tax 
bracket shareholder under current law ( [54.5 percent/43.9 percent] — 1). In con­
trast, under an integrated tax system using the shareholder's tax rate, the higher tax 
bracket shareholder’s effective tax rate is 106.7 percent higher than the lower tax 
bracket shareholder’s effective tax rate ([31 percent/15 percent] -1 )  with respect to 
distributed earnings.
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devised various ways to pass these earnings out o f the corporation in 
a form other than dividends. Although the current system contains 
several provisions to prevent corporations from circumventing the 
double tax, the enforcement of these provisions is both costly and 
administratively burdensome.
The Objectives of Integration
A system of integration would lower the cost o f capital and miti­
gate many of the distortions and inequities created by the present 
classical system by taxing corporate income only once. There are 
several methods or approaches available to relieve the double taxa­
tion of corporate profits.
In evaluating the alternative methods available, the AICPA has 
identified five basic objectives that an integrated system should seek 
to achieve:
• A more uniform taxation of income earned in the corporate and 
noncorporate sectors
• A reduction in the tax bias favoring debt financing
• A reduction of tax incentives for corporations to retain rather than 
distribute their profits
• An easy interface with foreign integrated tax systems
• No significant additional complexity for the tax system
Brief Overview of Alternative Methods
This study analyzes the three principal alternative methods o f 
implementing an integration system: (1) the flow-through method; (2) 
the dividends-paid deduction method; and (3) the shareholder-credit 
method. However, three variants o f these principal methods have also 
been considered: (1) the repeal o f the corporate tax; (2) the split-rate 
corporate-level tax; and (3) the dividend-exclusion method.39
39. The 1992 Treasury Report extensively analyzes four integration prototypes: the 
dividend-exclusion method, the flow-through method, the shareholder-credit 
method, and the CBIT. The report does not consider the repeal of the corporate tax 
or the split-rate method, and it provides only a brief evaluation o f the dividends- 
paid deduction method.
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A brief overview o f the three principal alternatives follows. A 
more detailed evaluation o f these methods, as well as a discussion of 
the three variants, will follow later in this study.
Flow-Through Method
The flow-through integration method achieves complete integra­
tion o f all corporate earnings by allocating all items of income to 
shareholders in a manner similar to the allocation of partnership and 
S corporation income under the current system. This method taxes 
all income at the shareholder level when earned, whether or not dis­
tributed. The flow-through method represents the purest form of 
integration because it subjects all corporate income to only one level 
o f tax, at the shareholder rates.
Dividends-Paid Deduction Method
The dividends-paid deduction method allows a corporation to 
deduct all or part o f dividends paid from taxable income. Under this 
method, the benefits o f integration inure to the corporation, since 
shareholders still report dividends received as income. To the extent 
that corporations make fully deductible distributions, one level of tax 
at the shareholder's tax rate should result. This method does not 
extend integration benefits to retained earnings.
Shareholder-Credit Method
The shareholder-credit method imposes a corporate-level tax on 
all earnings, but grants a credit to shareholders for a portion of the 
corporate tax paid that is allocated or imputed to dividends. This 
method generally requires shareholders to “gross up” their dividend 
income by the amount o f credit allowed. Integration is achieved by 
eliminating or reducing the tax on dividends at the shareholder level. 
Therefore, the benefits o f integration inure to the shareholder. As 
with the dividends-paid deduction method, double-tax relief applies 
only to distributed income. Therefore, integration benefits are not 
granted to retained income.
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Key Issues to Be Considered
Several issues must be addressed regardless o f the method of 
integration adopted, including the treatment of outbound and 
inbound foreign investment, tax-exempt shareholders, and corporate 
tax preferences, as well as the problems that will probably be encoun­
tered in the transition to an integrated system. This section examines 
these and other crucial issues that will need to be considered in 
designing an integrated system.
Foreign Investment by United States Residents
A principle o f taxation is that a system should be neutral toward 
domestic and foreign investment. Outbound neutrality, sometimes 
called capital-export neutrality, exists if domestic and foreign invest­
ment by resident shareholders are taxed equally. The present classi­
cal system seeks to achieve capital-export neutrality by allowing U.S. 
taxpayers a credit against their U.S. taxes for foreign tax paid on 
foreign-source income.
Most countries that have adopted an integration system treat for­
eign taxes less favorably than domestic taxes, creating a bias against 
foreign investment. Additionally, some o f these countries create 
another bias against foreign investment by domestic corporations by 
levying a compensatory tax40 on distributions from foreign-source
40. A system of integration can levy a compensatory tax on distributions made out 
of nontaxable income. This tax increases a corporations tax burden and reduces the 
benefits of integration. By levying such a tax on foreign-source income or on 
income that is tax-exempt because of corporate tax preferences, the system guaran­
tees that at least one level of tax is paid on all income.
21
2
income that are not subject to domestic taxation (even though a tax 
has already been paid on this income in the foreign country). By not 
allowing foreign tax credits to offset the compensatory tax, this 
treatment results in a double tax on foreign-source income while 
subjecting domestic-source income to only one level o f taxation. 
However, to mitigate this result, these countries generally consider 
fully taxed domestic-source income to be distributed first, thereby 
imposing a compensatory tax only on distributions in excess o f 
fully taxed domestic-source income. In an integrated system, capital- 
export neutrality could be achieved by passing the benefit o f foreign 
tax credits through to the shareholders. The methodology 
for achieving this result would vary depending on the integration 
method adopted.41
Foreign Shareholders
Inbound or capital-import neutrality exists if domestic invest­
ments by both resident and nonresident shareholders receive equal 
treatment. When dividends paid to foreign shareholders receive the 
same integration benefits as distributions made to domestic share­
holders, capital-import neutrality results and the inequality between 
foreign and domestic shareholders is eliminated.
Under the current classical system, the United States seeks to 
achieve some level o f capital-import neutrality by imposing with­
holding taxes on dividends paid to foreign shareholders. For foreign 
corporations that conduct business in the United States through a 
U.S. branch, the double taxation o f their U.S. profits is achieved 
through the imposition o f the branch profits tax enacted by the 
1986 TRA.42
41. If foreign and domestic taxes do not receive equal treatment, and if distribu­
tions come out of domestic income first, a corporation with $100 taxable income 
would pay a total tax of $34 (assuming a U.S. tax rate o f 34 percent). Suppose the $34 
tax is composed of $10 in foreign tax and $24 in domestic tax. The $24 domestic tax 
results from the $34 statutory amount less a foreign tax credit of $10 for the taxes 
paid to the foreign government. In this situation, a compensatory tax would be paid 
if distributions exceeded $46.60, the amount of after-tax domestic taxable income 
that would create a tax of $24 computed at a 34 percent rate ($24/.34 = $70.60; 
$70.60 -  $24 = $46.60). If foreign and domestic taxes receive equal treatment, a 
compensatory tax would result only if distributions exceeded $66, the total after-tax 
amount of taxable income ($100-$34).
42. IRC Section 884.
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The goal of achieving capital-import neutrality must be weighed 
against the costs of extending integration benefits to foreign share­
holders. Many foreign shareholders pay little or no tax in the United 
States on dividends from domestic corporations.43 Therefore, exten­
sion of integration benefits to foreign shareholders would allow a 
portion of corporate earnings either to escape taxation in the United 
States or to be taxed at a very low rate.44 Presumably, because the 
costs (that is, lost revenue) resulting from taxing earnings paid to 
foreign shareholders at low rates outweigh the benefits of neutrality, 
countries that have adopted integration generally have not extended 
integration benefits to foreign shareholders except by special 
reciprocal agreements in their treaties.
Capital-import neutrality would be achieved in an integrated sys­
tem by taxing foreign shareholders in the same manner as domestic 
shareholders. Under some methods of integration, this result would 
require US. withholding on corporate distributions. The level of 
withholding and the level o f integration benefits granted to foreign 
shareholders would be the subject o f treaty negotiations, enhancing 
the position of the United States in obtaining integration benefits for 
US. shareholders in other countries.45
Tax-Exempt Shareholders
The mix of shareholders has changed over the past fifteen years to 
the point that pension plans and other tax-exempt organizations hold 
a large percentage of corporate stock.46 Currently, corporate divi­
dends and interest received by tax-exempt organizations are not 
subject to income tax; however, an exempt organizations share of 
income from publicly traded partnerships that are not treated as
43. Most income earned by foreign residents escapes taxation in the United States 
because of provisions included in tax treaties.
44. This situation would not arise if an exclusion were available at the share­
holder level.
45. See Michael J. Graetz, Testimony Before the House Committee on Ways and 
Means on the President’s 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals, 95th Cong., 2d 
sess., 1978, 6144-6166.
46. An individual taxpayer pays a tax on corporate earnings distributed to pension 
plans when the taxpayer receives pension payments. Therefore, special provisions 
that distinguish pension plans from other tax-exempt shareholders may need to be 
included in an integration system.
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corporations is taxed as unrelated trade or business income. If 
integration benefits are extended to tax-exempt shareholders, it could 
result in corporate income’s escaping all levels o f income tax; whether 
this is a desirable result is a tax policy question beyond the scope of 
this study.
The extension o f corporate integration benefits to tax-exempt 
shareholders is a major tax policy issue with significant revenue 
implications that must be addressed. At the present time, equity 
investments dominate the investment portfolios o f most tax-exempt 
organizations.47 It is unclear whether the denial o f integration 
benefits to tax-exempt shareholders would cause these organizations 
to shift their investments from equity to debt; also, it is not clear 
whether this result is desirable.48 One possible solution to this 
problem is to tax interest income as unrelated trade or business 
income;49 this should significantly reduce the portfolio shifting many 
IRC Section 501(c) organizations and pension plans might otherwise 
undertake.50 An alternative approach is to make the tax credit or the 
withheld amount with respect to dividends refundable to tax-exempt 
organizations. Corporate income from both debt and equity would be 
tax-exempt, thus eliminating the need to shift portfolio investments.
Tax Preferences
Corporate tax preferences reduce the amount of corporate 
income subject to tax through the allowance of special exclusions, 
deductions, credits, and other provisions not recognized for financial 
accounting purposes. Corporate preferences allow corporations to
47. See 1992 Treasury Report, Table 6.1.
48. Denial of integration benefits to tax-exempt shareholders may cause a portfolio 
shift because equity investment becomes less valuable in relation to debt invest­
ments. This situation could arise if the rate of return on equity investment 
decreases below that o f debt. One response to integration could be a decrease in 
actual dividend payments by corporations, since shareholders would require a 
smaller amount o f dividends to have the same after-tax cash flow as under current 
law. (This idea contradicts the popular notion discussed earlier that integration 
would increase dividend payments.) If corporations do decrease dividend pay­
ments, tax-exempt organizations are more likely to shift their portfolios from equity 
to debt.
49. IRC Section 512(c)(2).
50. IRC Section 501(c) organizations include most charitable, educational, and 
not-for-profit service organizations.
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distribute income to shareholders that has not been taxed at the full 
corporate tax rate. In designing an integration system, it must be 
determined whether tax preferences should be passed through to the 
shareholder or retained at the corporate level. Proponents o f passing 
through tax preferences to shareholders advance two arguments; 
first, that distributed items of tax preference should be treated as if 
earned by the individual, not the corporation; and second, that a 
reduction of corporate tax on earnings devalues tax preferences. Sup­
porters o f the first argument believe that tax preferences should be 
passed through to maintain the incentives for which the tax prefer­
ences were originally enacted.
Opponents counter that the tax treatment o f corporations and 
individuals is not intended to be equal, as current law purposely 
distinguishes between corporations and individuals in many areas, 
especially tax-incentive provisions. These opponents also argue that 
passing corporate preferences through to individuals would create 
new inefficiencies and inequities in the tax system, since granting 
special deductions or exclusions produces a greater tax benefit to 
shareholders in higher tax brackets than to shareholders in lower 
brackets.51 In addition, if integration seeks only to eliminate the 
corporate-level tax on distributions, then preferences should not 
be passed through to shareholders.52 The current system specifi­
cally curtails the ability o f corporations to distribute untaxed income 
to shareholders tax-free.53 Passing through tax preferences to 
shareholders under integration would reverse the effect o f these 
provisions.
The second argument in favor o f passing through tax preferences 
to shareholders relies on the fact that any reduction in the corporate 
tax also reduces the benefits o f tax preferences. Since integration 
reduces the tax on corporate earnings, the benefit corporations can 
receive from tax preferences is also reduced. Proponents o f this view 
argue that the benefit of these preferences should be passed through 
to the shareholders to compensate for the value lost by reducing the 
corporate tax. Supporters also contend that by not passing corporate
51. See The Treatment o f Nonbusiness Expenditures: The Form o f the Tax Allow­
ance-D eduction or Credit (Washington, D.C.: AICPA, 1990).
52. See Alvin C. Warren, “The Relations and Integration of Individual and 
Corporate Income Taxes,” Harvard Law Review 94, no. 719 (1981), 777-778.
53. The earnings-and-profits rules under IRC Section 312 prohibit earnings that 
are not taxed at the corporate level from being passed to shareholders tax-free.
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tax preferences through to shareholders, the system would eliminate 
the tax incentives that preferences are meant to provide. However, 
opponents o f this view argue that since integration accomplishes the 
same goal that corporate tax preferences were originally meant 
to achieve (i.e., the lowering o f total corporate tax), the additional 
benefits created by passing through tax preferences become 
unnecessary.
When corporate tax preferences are not passed through to share­
holders, most other countries that have adopted an integrated system 
levy a compensatory tax. This tax applies to distributions of prefer­
ence items that otherwise would have been tax-free.
The ordering o f distributions must be addressed whether prefer­
ences are passed through to shareholders or whether a compensatory 
tax is levied on distributed preferences. Possible choices include 
stacking preferences last, stacking preferences first, or prorating 
distributions between taxable and nontaxable income. Most foreign 
integrated systems currently stack preferences last, which means 
they treat all distributions as coming from fully taxed income first. 
This method seems to be the easiest to administer.
A related issue is the effect integration would have on the alterna­
tive minimum tax. Since the current alternative minimum tax relies 
largely on restoring preferences to the tax base, policymakers would 
need to reevaluate the role o f the alternative minimum tax in an 
integrated system. The issues that would need to be addressed and 
the actual changes required will likely be quite extensive and are 
beyond the scope of this study.
Retained Earnings
The adoption of an integrated system raises the issue o f whether 
both distributed income and retained earnings should receive the 
benefits o f integration. If both receive full integration benefits, no dis­
tortion of either vertical or horizontal equity should occur. This type 
of system should eliminate tax-induced investment decisions and 
achieve neutrality concerning the choice of business entity.54
Under our current system, a shareholder who sells or exchanges 
stock recognizes a gain or loss measured by the difference between
54. See appendix B for a comparison of the effect of corporate distribution levels 
on effective tax rates under current law and alternative tax integration methods.
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the amount realized in the transaction and the adjusted basis o f the 
stock.55 If the amount realized exceeds the basis, a gain is recognized. 
This gain reflects both the retained earnings of the corporation and 
the net unrealized appreciation in the value of the corporations 
assets. Recognition o f this gain at the shareholder level results in the 
double taxation of a corporations retained earnings.
The reduction or elimination of capital gains taxes on corporate 
investments would mitigate the second tax on undistributed earn- 
ings.56 Another approach would adjust shareholder stock basis by the 
amount o f retained earnings allocated to the stock, in a manner simi­
lar to the flow-through method.57
Nondividend Distributions
Another issue is whether distributions other than those from cur­
rent earnings should be eligible for integration benefits. Under our 
current system, ordinary distributions are treated first as being from 
current and accumulated earnings, then as a recovery o f capital, and 
finally as a gain on the exchange o f the stock.58 Furthermore, the cur­
rent system treats liquidating distributions and certain redemption 
transactions as the equivalent o f stock sales regardless of the amount 
of current and accumulated corporate earnings.59
Without equal treatment of all distributions, corporations would 
need to specify the type of distribution made, and this would require 
more complex recordkeeping. If integration benefits were limited to 
distributions of current and accumulated earnings, the reverse of 
current tax planning strategies would apply. For example, if regular 
dividends received the benefits o f integration and liquidating distribu-
55. IRC Section 1001(1).
56. Many of the countries that have integrated their corporate and individual 
income tax systems provide some preferential treatment for capital gains on stock 
sales through either basis indexing or reduced effective tax rates.
57. None o f the countries that have adopted the shareholder-credit method allow 
for such an allocation. However, the Treasury Department's Blueprints fo r  Basic Tax 
Reform and the Carter Commission in Canada in 1966 recommended that such an 
allocation be included in a shareholder-credit method of integration. See U.S. 
Department o f the Treasury, Blueprints fo r  Basic Tax Reform (1977) and Report o f 
the Royal Commission on Taxation (1966).
58. IRC Section 301(c).
59. IRC Sections 302(a) and 331.
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tions did not, some corporations might postpone liquidating until all 
earnings and profits were distributed, a move that could result in an 
inefficient use of capital. On the other hand, if distributions in 
redemption or liquidation received integration benefits, a bias 
against sales o f stock in the open market might occur, causing many 
shareholders to hold on to stock that they would rather sell, again 
resulting in an inefficient use o f capital.
Capital losses in an integrated system need to be considered. For 
example, if a shareholder strips substantial assets from a corporation, 
the value of his or her stock may be reduced below the basis o f the 
stock. If dividends are received tax-free under an integrated system, 
the subsequent sale o f the stock will produce an artificial tax loss.
The dividend stripping strategy is addressed under our current 
system in several ways, including a provision that requires a share­
holder receiving an extraordinary dividend to reduce his or her basis 
in the underlying stock by the untaxed portion of a dividend.60 
Similarly, an integrated system could require a basis reduction for 
shareholders who receive certain distributions subject to integration 
benefits. Another approach would simply disallow any deduction for 
certain capital losses, an alternative implemented under our current 
system in the consolidated return regulations.61
The Level of Integration
If integration benefits were provided only for distributed income, 
full integration would allow either a credit for all corporate tax paid 
on distributed income or a full deduction for all dividends paid. Par­
tial integration allows either a percentage of tax to be creditable or a 
deduction for only part o f the dividends paid. Other countries that 
have adopted integration differ in their treatment o f this problem, 
with some allowing full credit while others allow only partial benefit. 
Adopting partial integration benefits could substantially decrease the 
loss o f revenue, but obviously it would not fully accomplish the goals 
o f integration.
60. IRC Section 1059.
61. Treasury Regulations, Section 1.1502-20.
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Intercorporate Dividends
Dividends paid to corporate shareholders also require examina­
tion, since most of the rules related to integration consider share­
holders to be individual taxpayers. However, a large percentage of 
shareholders includes other corporations, many o f which belong to 
affiliated groups that file consolidated tax returns. If, under an 
integrated system, the corporate tax is incidental to the individual 
income tax, dividends paid to corporate shareholders should receive 
the same benefits as dividends paid to individual shareholders.
To tax intercorporate dividend income properly in an integrated 
system, the dividends-received deduction allowed to corporations 
under the current tax system would need to be modified. For exam­
ple, corporate income would not be taxed if the payer corporation 
were allowed a deduction for dividends paid, and if the recipient 
corporation were allowed a second deduction for the dividends 
received. Alternatively, allowing the recipient corporation both a 
deduction and a tax credit for the dividends received would also 
produce a double-tax benefit.
These problems should arise only with intercorporate dividends 
paid outside a consolidated group, since intercorporate dividends 
within a consolidated group are eliminated. In this regard, integra­
tion concepts should be applied at the consolidated level, with the 
consolidated group treated as a single taxpayer.
Impact on State Taxation
In many states, the computation o f a taxpayer’s state taxable 
income begins with the taxpayer’s federal taxable income. Therefore, 
if an integration method alters the computation o f federal taxable 
income, adjustments to the federal amount may be required to 
prevent erosion o f the state income tax base. Depending on the 
integration method adopted at the federal level, such adjustments 
could add significant complexities to state income tax systems.
The adoption of integration at the state level could result in the 
shifting of tax bases between the states. Such a shift would arise if 
corporate income were taxed in the shareholder’s state o f residence, 
instead of in the state where the corporation conducts business. A 
change from taxing income at its origin to taxing it at its destination 
could substantially alter the tax revenues for a particular state. In
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addition, state integration could result in the loss o f a states ability to 
independently tax corporate income generated within its borders.62
Financial Statement Impact
Integration may have a significant effect on corporate financial 
earnings, depending on the type of method adopted. There should be 
no effect on the paying corporations financial statements if the 
shareholder-credit method is adopted, because it would not change 
the tax paid at the corporate level. In addition, retained earnings 
would be reduced by the amount o f dividends paid and the taxes 
incurred. If the amount of dividends remains constant, ending 
retained earnings should remain the same as under the system 
without integration because the corporations actual cash outflow 
would not change.
The most important impact the dividends-paid deduction 
method would have on a corporations financial statements is the 
temporary lack of comparability between different periods. However, 
adequate footnote disclosure can mitigate this lack of comparability. 
Financial statements from periods prior to the adoption of integra­
tion would not be comparable to statements from periods after 
adoption, because the dividends-paid deduction method perma­
nently reduces the amount of taxes due by the paying corporation. 
Hence, this method increases the amount reported as net income by 
the income tax savings received from the deduction of the amount 
distributed. Adoption o f this method would increase retained 
earnings by the same amount. For corporations that pay large 
amounts o f dividends, this increase could be substantial.
The flow-through method presents the same comparability 
problems as the dividends-paid deduction method. Income reported 
in financial statements prior to adoption of integration would not be 
comparable to income reported in statements after adoption. The 
corporation no longer would have a tax liability, since shareholders 
would report all corporate earnings.63 Again, proper footnote dis­
closure should mitigate the temporary comparability problem. The
62. Other countries — for example, Germany—generally have not adopted integra­
tion below the federal level.
63. A similar comparability problem occurs when a corporation converts from a 
C corporation to an S corporation.
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amount o f net income reported on a corporations financial state­
ments should increase by the tax savings. Retained earnings should 
also increase by the same amount.
Transition
Two major options would need to be considered during transition 
to an integrated system: (1) whether to phase in the integration system 
or adopt it immediately and (2) whether to extend integration 
benefits to pre-enactment equity and/or pre-enactment earnings. 
The loss o f revenue caused by integration could be reduced by phas­
ing in the system at the cost o f added complexity. Another justifica­
tion for a phase-in period would be to reduce the first-year windfall 
created by the increase in stock prices that immediate integration 
could produce.
Distribution o f pre-enactment earnings may be the most difficult 
area to administer. If integration applied only to distributions out of 
post-enactment earnings, the system would need to stipulate an 
appropriate ordering of distributions and provide for the main­
tenance of complex records to account for them correctly. Some 
countries that have adopted integration levy a compensatory tax on 
distributions of pre-enactment earnings.
If the integration system distinguished between old and new 
equity, additional problems could occur because the different issues 
o f stock would have different benefits and values. If only new equity 
received integration benefits, these shares would be more valuable 
than the older shares. Thus, shareholders o f the older stock would be 
at a disadvantage in the marketplace. This distinction between old 
and new equity also would add complexity to the system, as corpora­
tions would be required to keep records o f the percentage o f old and 
new equity issued and, in the case of the shareholder-credit method, 
the names o f the shareholders who own the new equity. This detailed 
recordkeeping could become quite burdensome as additional shares 
o f stock were bought and sold.
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International Experience 
With Integration
Many countries, including most major industrialized nations, 
have adopted a system of integration. Some form of the shareholder 
credit appears to have been almost universally adopted, but each 
country employs different rules within the shareholder-credit 
method to achieve integration. Several countries initially adopted a 
split-rate tax system,64 but currently all o f them have either changed 
entirely to the shareholder-credit method or employ the split-rate 
and shareholder-credit systems simultaneously.65 Countries aban­
doned the split-rate system because of the problems associated with 
distributions of previously taxed income and o f earnings that were 
not fully taxed at the corporate level.66 The flow-through method also 
came under consideration in Canada and Germany, but because of
64. A split-rate system normally taxes distributed income at a lower rate than 
retained earnings. Both Germany and Japan have used a split-rate system.
65. See appendix C, “Degree of Reduction of Economic Double Taxation in 
OECD Countries.”
66. See Radler and Edwards, “The Split-Rate o f Corporation Income Tax in 
Germany—A Tax Advantage for Foreign Owned Subsidiaries,” Common Market 
Report (Chicago: Commerce Clearing House [1963, transfer binder]), 9051. 
Reasons cited for changing from the split-rate system in Japan include the need to 
eliminate unnecessary complexities and unfairness in distributions of nontaxable 
income that a split-rate system creates.
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the many problems encountered, both countries decided to forgo 
adopting such a system.67
It is a truism that the experiences o f other countries in imple­
menting their systems should benefit the United States if it decides to 
adopt integration. However, because of cultural and political differ­
ences, the results in the United States may vary from those in other 
countries. The following discussion examines the integration systems 
adopted by Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, 
Germany, and Australia. The systems have been grouped according to 
how they account for tax preferences.68
Pass-Through of Corporate Tax 
Preferences to Shareholders
when the shareholder-credit method permits the pass-through 
o f corporate tax preferences, the credit allowed may be larger than 
the total tax paid. Only two of the countries studied, Canada and 
Japan, pass through preferences to shareholders.
Canada
In 1972, Canada adopted its current method of integration, which 
is perhaps the most generous to shareholders. It employs a 
shareholder-credit system requiring shareholders to gross up income 
by 25 percent o f total dividends received. The method allows the 
shareholder a credit o f 16.67 percent against the national tax, with the 
remainder of the gross up being allowed as a credit against provincial 
taxes. The credit can be used only to the extent that the shareholder 
has current-year tax liability; unused credits are not refundable and 
cannot be carried backward or forward.
Because the credit is nonrefundable, the Canadian system does 
not extend integration benefits to either tax-exempt or foreign share-
67. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “The Treatment of Corporate Preference Items 
Under an Integrated Tax System: A Comparative Analysis,” Tax Lawyer 44, no. 1, 
197-198.
68. This grouping follows a study performed by Avi-Yonah and reported in “The 
Treatment o f Corporate Preference Items Under an Integrated Tax System: A Com­
parative Analysis.” See appendixes D and E for a comparison of the aforementioned 
countries’ methods of tax integration and their respective combined corporate and 
shareholder tax burdens based on different levels o f earnings distributions.
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holders. Foreign taxes paid by domestic corporations are integrated 
with the individual tax system, which means the system does not 
discriminate against foreign-source income. By adopting a fixed rate 
o f credit without levying a compensatory tax, the Canadian system 
permits income that has not been fully taxed at the corporate level 
because of corporate tax preferences to be passed through to the 
shareholders tax-free.
The level o f integration this system allows depends on the 
effective tax rate o f the corporation paying the dividend. In most 
cases, only partial integration results, because the national tax plus 
the provincial tax exceeds the credit o f 25 percent. However, some 
corporations receive full integration, and corporations with an effec­
tive tax rate of less than 20 percent (combined federal and provincial 
taxation) receive “super integration” benefits.69 Super integration 
occurs because shareholders still receive a credit equal to 25 percent, 
even though the corporation pays tax at a lower rate. The Canadian 
method is the only system that allows super integration.
Japan
Japan originally adopted a system of integration in 1961. Until 
April 1 , 1990, it employed a method that included both a shareholder 
credit and a split-rate component. Tax reform enacted in 1987 elimi­
nated the split-rate component, leaving only the shareholder-credit 
system. The current system allows a 10 percent credit to taxpayers 
with a total income of ten million yen or less, while those with income 
in excess o f this amount receive a 5 percent credit.70 Shareholders are 
not required to gross up income by the allowable credit. The credit 
rate differential coupled with the absence of gross-up results in 
corporate incomes being subjected to progressive tax rates. This
69. Super integration occurs if a corporation has an effective tax rate o f  less than 20 
percent, because the shareholder effectively receives a 25 percent credit. For 
example, if the effective tax rate is 20 percent, a corporation with $100 pretax 
income is subject to $20 tax and has $80 after-tax income. The shareholder receives 
an $80 dividend with a 25 percent credit. This results in a gross-up shareholder 
credit of $20, which compares to the $20 of tax paid by the corporation. If, instead, 
the effective tax rate on a corporation is 15 percent, a corporation with $100 pretax 
income is subject to $15 tax and has $85 after-tax income. The shareholder receives 
an $85 dividend with a 25 percent credit, which results in a gross-up shareholder 
credit o f $21.25. Super integration occurs because the shareholder credit allowed 
exceeds the corporate tax paid ($21.25 -  $15 = $6.25).
70. Ten million yen is equal to approximately $80,000, as of July 1992.
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method does not permit the credit to be refunded if it is not used in 
the current tax year, and shareholders cannot carry any unused credit 
backward or forward.
The Japanese system does not grant integration benefits to either 
foreign or tax-exempt shareholders. Generally, the system does not 
integrate foreign-source income. Special exceptions to this rule can 
be made through bilateral treaty provisions.
The system also permits corporations to pass through the benefits 
o f all corporate tax preferences to the shareholders without levying a 
compensatory tax. However, this issue is not as critical in Japan as in 
other countries, because the Japanese tax code allows only a minimal 
number of corporate preferences. As an additional measure to limit 
the benefits derived from the pass-through of corporate tax prefer­
ences, Japan levies a “liquidation tax” on any unrealized appreciation 
within the corporation whenever the company liquidates or merges 
with another corporation. This tax helps to ensure that the corpora­
tion pays at least one level of tax on income excluded from taxation 
because o f tax preferences.
Advance Corporation Tax
One method used to prevent the pass-through o f corporate tax 
preferences to shareholders is the advance corporation tax (ACT). 
This method has been adopted by only one country, the United King­
dom, because o f the many complexities and revenue considerations 
involved in implementation.
United Kingdom
Under the United Kingdom’s system, corporations remit an ACT 
payment each time they make a dividend distribution.71 Individual 
shareholders gross up dividends by the ACT payment and take a 
credit against their tax liability for the same amount. The government 
refunds any excess ACT to the shareholder. In addition, the payment 
o f the ACT partially reduces the payor corporations tax liability for
71. The amount of the ACT payment equals the distribution multiplied by the basic 
rate o f individual tax divided by one minus the basic rate. Currently, the basic rate 
is 25 percent. Therefore, the equation for the calculation o f the ACT payment is 
D X .25/(1 -  .25) = ⅓ D, where D represents the total amount distributed.
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the year in which the dividend is paid. This reduction is restricted to 
the portion o f the corporate income tax rate equal to the basic rate o f 
individual taxation (currently, the corporate rate is 33 percent and the 
basic rate is 25 percent, so 25/33 of the corporate tax may be offset by 
ACT). However, the system does not allow any excess to be refunded 
to the corporation. Instead, a corporation can carry excess ACT back 
six years to offset its tax liability in those years, and it can carry excess 
ACT forward indefinitely to reduce its tax liability in future years.
Corporate shareholders do not receive the benefit o f the credit 
because intercorporate dividends are not taxable. Instead, the recipi­
ent corporation maintains a record of this income in a franking 
account, and the corporation s share of the credit passes through to its 
individual shareholders on subsequent distribution by the second 
corporation, which can reduce its own ACT payments by the ACT 
associated with the dividend received. ACT is not levied on distribu­
tions from subsidiaries to corporate shareholders holding over 50 
percent of the shares if appropriate elections are filed.
The United Kingdom’s system does not provide integration 
benefits to foreign-source income, but it does allow some relief to 
foreign-source income through the use of foreign tax credits. To mini­
mize the loss of these credits, the government determines that 
dividends are paid out o f domestic income first.72 Normally, integra­
tion benefits are not extended to foreign shareholders, although 
exceptions can be made on a treaty-by-treaty basis.73
Unlike most other countries, the United Kingdom grants integra­
tion benefits to tax-exempt organizations by allowing a refund of the 
ACT credit to these shareholders. Furthermore, by levying the ACT, 
the system disallows the pass-through of corporate tax preferences to 
shareholders, which helps to ensure that nontaxable income cannot
72. See Emil M. Sunley, “International Aspects o f Integration,” Bulletin fo r  Interna­
tional Fiscal Documentation (1979), 2292-2297.
73. For example, under the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty, a refund of one-half of the ACT is 
made to a U.S. company owning 10 percent or more of the voting power in the U.K. 
company paying the dividend, subject to a 5 percent withholding tax on the sum of 
the dividend and the refund of one-half of the ACT. Other U.S. shareholders are 
entitled to a refund o f the entire ACT, but they are subject to a 15 percent withhold­
ing tax on the sum of the dividend and the ACT refund. To illustrate, for a dividend 
of £75, an ACT of £25 applies. A 10 percent U.S. corporate shareholder receives the 
dividend of £75 plus an ACT refund of £12.5 less a withholding tax of £4.375, for a 
net cash receipt of £83.125. Other U.S. shareholders receive the dividend of £75 
plus an ACT refund of £25 less a withholding tax of £15, for a net cash receipt of £85.
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be distributed tax-free. In the United Kingdom, the ACT functions as 
a minimum tax ensuring that the system levies at least one level o f tax 
on all income.
The United Kingdoms ACT system produces an artificial amount 
o f credit because the credit bears no relationship to the amount of tax 
paid by the corporation. Instead, the amount of the credit relies on 
the level o f distributions made by each corporation. Problems also 
occur in this system when corporations have net operating losses, 
engage in reorganizations, pay intercorporate dividends, or have 
foreign-source income.74 These difficulties may account for why this 
type o f ACT system has not been adopted by any other country.
Compensatory Tax and Tracking of Income
Tracking income and levying a compensatory tax provides 
another method that prevents the pass-through of corporate tax 
preferences to shareholders. The simplicity and accuracy of this type 
of system varies greatly, depending upon the rules adopted by each 
country. Italy, France, and Germany have all adopted some form of 
this method.
Italy
Italy adopted a shareholder-credit method o f integration in 1977. 
The Italian system achieves full integration by allowing a shareholder 
credit o f 56.25 percent on all dividends received from domestic cor­
porations. Since shareholders must gross up their dividends by this 
amount, they receive a net credit equal to 36 percent, the same as the 
full national corporate tax rate.75 The system allows refunds to share­
holders for any credit not used in the current year.
74. A more detailed description of the problems encountered under the United 
Kingdom’s version of ACT can be found in Avi-Yonah, “The Treatment o f Corporate 
Preference Items Under an Integrated Tax System: A Comparative Analysis,” 
213-214.
75. Assuming that a corporation has $100 of taxable income, the corporate tax rate 
equals 36 percent, and the corporation distributes all after-tax income, distribu­
tions of $64 ($100 -  $36) would be made. The shareholder must gross up income 
by $36 ($64 X .5625). Therefore, the shareholder reports total income of $100 ($64 
in dividends received plus a $36 gross up). At a 40 percent individual tax rate, the 
shareholder pays a tax of $40 less a credit o f $36. This results in a net tax of $4. The 
shareholder would have a net receipt of $60 ($64 dividend less $4 tax). Thus, distri­
butions o f corporate income are taxed at the shareholder’s tax rate.
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Italy does not permit integration benefits to be extended to 
foreign-source income; instead, corporations are allowed a 60 per­
cent deduction for dividends from related foreign corporations, and 
other shareholders receive the benefit o f foreign tax credits as a 
means of reducing the excess tax on foreign-source income. The sys­
tem also does not extend integration benefits to foreign or tax-exempt 
shareholders.
The Italian system prevents the pass-through of preferences by 
requiring corporations to track income. Under this method, corpora­
tions must maintain records of all income and distributions. Divi­
dends are considered to be paid out o f fully taxable income first. 
Distributions in excess of fully taxable income are subject to a 
compensatory tax.
France
France’s method o f integration, although similar to the Italian 
system, is more accurate and, therefore, more complex. The French 
system, adopted in 1965, allows a shareholder credit o f 50 percent on 
all dividends received by domestic shareholders, who must gross up 
dividends by the amount of the allowable credit.76 This system 
produces substantially full integration because it allows credits equal 
to 33/34 of corporate taxes. Shareholders lose the benefit o f credits 
not used in the current year, because these credits are not refundable.
France’s territorial system of taxation allows foreign-source 
income to escape taxation, eliminating the need for both allowances 
for foreign tax credits and the extension of integration benefits to 
foreign-source income. Generally, foreign shareholders receive no 
integration benefits, but exceptions can be made by special provi-
76. Assuming that a corporation has $100 of taxable income, the corporate tax rate 
equals 34 percent, and the corporation distributes all after-tax income, distribu­
tions of $66 ($100 -  $34) would be made. The shareholder must gross up income 
by $33 ($66 x .5). Therefore, the shareholder reports a total income of $99 ($66 
dividends received plus a $33 gross up). At a 40 percent individual tax rate, the 
shareholder pays a tax of $39.60 less a credit of $33. This results in a net tax of $6.60. 
The shareholder would have a net receipt of $59.40 ($66 dividend less $6.60 tax).
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sions on a treaty-by-treaty basis.77 The system grants integration 
benefits to pension plans and tax-exempt organizations that fulfill a 
public interest, but excludes all other tax-exempt shareholders.78
The system precludes the pass-through of corporate tax prefer­
ences to shareholders by requiring corporations to track income by 
specifying it as either fully taxed or non-fully taxed. A compensatory 
tax, equal to the credit attached to the dividend, applies to any 
portion of the distributions made out of income not fully taxed at the 
corporate level. Distributions are deemed to be made from the 
current year’s fully taxed income first, then out o f fully taxed income 
earned in the past four years, and finally out o f non-fully taxed 
income.
Germ any
In 1977, Germany changed from a split-rate system only to an 
integration system combining the split-rate and shareholder-credit 
methods. The split-rate system levies a 50 percent tax79 on retained 
earnings and a 36 percent tax on distributed earnings, whereas the 
shareholder credit achieves full integration on distributed earnings 
by granting a credit equal to 36 percent o f gross dividends (56.25 per­
cent o f net dividends). In return, the shareholder must gross up divi­
dends by the same amount. The credit, if not used in the current year, 
may then be refunded to domestic taxable shareholders.
The system does not extend the shareholder-credit benefits to 
foreign-source income. Instead, a corporation can avoid one level o f 
tax on foreign income through the use o f a tax-sparing credit that the
77. For example, under the tax treaty between the United States and France, a U.S. 
company owning 10 percent or more of the voting power in the French company 
paying the dividend is entitled to no refund of avoir fiscal but is subject to a 5 per­
cent withholding rate. Other U.S. shareholders are entitled to a refund of the entire 
avoir fiscal but are subject to a 15 percent withholding rate on both the dividend 
and the avoir fiscal refund. To illustrate, for a dividend on 1,000 francs, an avoir 
fiscal of 500 francs applies. A 10 percent U.S. corporate shareholder receives the 
dividend of 1,000 francs less a withholding tax of 50 francs for a net cash receipt of 
950 francs. Other U.S. shareholders receive the dividend of 1,000 francs plus the 
avoir fiscal refund of 500 francs less a withholding tax of 225 francs, for a net cash 
receipt o f 1275 francs.
78. See Harry G. Gouervitch, “Corporate Tax Integration: The European Expe­
rience,” The Tax Lawyer 31, no. 1 (Fall 1977), 65-112.
79. Since 1990, the system has levied a 50 percent tax on retained earnings. Before 
then, retained earnings were taxed at a 56 percent rate.
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government grants for income earned from less developed countries, 
through tax treaty, or through the use of foreign tax credits.80 Neither 
foreign shareholders nor tax-exempt organizations receive 
shareholder-credit integration benefits. The system precludes the 
pass-through of corporate tax preferences to the shareholder by levy­
ing a compensatory tax on all distributions out o f non-fully taxed 
income. Germany requires the tracking of income through the use of 
the most sophisticated system of its kind, in which corporations 
maintain multiple income accounts based on the rate o f tax paid and 
the nature o f any tax-exempt income.
Tracking of Income Taxes Paid
The last method employed to prevent the pass-through of cor­
porate tax preferences to shareholders requires the tracking of 
income taxes paid. This method, which has been adopted by Austra­
lia, prevents pass-through of preferences by limiting the allowable 
credit to the total amount o f taxes paid.
Australia
Australia adopted a shareholder-credit system of integration in 
1987.81 If a corporation pays the full corporate rate of 39 percent, the 
Australian system allows a full shareholder credit for taxes paid by the 
corporation. If the corporation pays dividends out o f income not 
taxed at the full corporate rate, the Australian system reduces the 
allowable credit. Shareholders are required to gross up income by the 
amount of the credit. The system does not permit the credit to be 
refunded or to be carried backward or forward. Therefore, share­
holders lose the benefit o f the credit if it is not fully used during the 
year in which the dividend giving rise to the credit was received.
The Australian system does not grant integration benefits to for­
eign tax paid on foreign-source income. However, the system allows 
foreign tax credits to the recipient o f the foreign-source income in 
respect o f the foreign tax paid. In addition, foreign shareholders 
receive integration benefits only to the extent o f any withholding tax
80. See Sunley, “International Aspects o f Integration,” 2295.
81. New Zealand adopted a system o f integration very similar to the Australian 
system a year later, in 1988.
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payable on the dividend to the foreign shareholder. With a few excep­
tions, integration benefits also are not extended to dividends paid to 
tax-exempt organizations.
Australia has benefited from its observations of other countries’ 
experiences with corporate tax preferences and has chosen to adopt 
a unique method that prevents the pass-through of preferences. 
Under this method, the corporation must maintain a franking system 
that keeps track of the maximum amount of dividends that can be dis­
tributed and still receive the full credit.82 The corporation determines 
the percentage of its income to be franked, and also is responsible for 
reporting to the shareholders the proper taxable amount of dividends 
and the available credit. Because the franking system tracks and 
accounts for all taxes paid, preventing pass-through o f preferences to 
shareholders becomes less difficult. Because o f the varying ratios of 
credit available on distributions, this system becomes significantly 
more complex at the shareholder level than a system that levies a 
compensatory tax at the corporate level.
82. The corporate tax paid, multiplied by one minus the corporate tax rate, divided 
by the corporate tax rate, represents the increase in the franking account. For exam­
ple, if a corporation has $100 in income and pays a tax of $39, the franking account 
is increased by $61 ($39 x [(1-.39)/.39]).
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Evaluation of Alternative 
Integration Methods
The AICPA studied and evaluated six alternative methods of 
integration. Three methods —the flow-through method, the 
dividends-paid deduction method, and the shareholder-credit 
method—are the most widely recognized alternatives. These 
methods will be discussed in detail in this section. Three other 
methods of implementing integration — the repeal of the corporate 
tax, the split-rate corporate-level tax, and the dividend-exclusion 
method—were also studied. These methods will be discussed later in 
this section.
Flow-Through Method
The flow-through method eliminates the corporate-level income 
tax by allocating a corporations income or loss proportionately 
among all its shareholders and imposing tax consequences at the 
shareholder level. This method results in complete integration of 
both distributed and retained earnings, and has the effect o f treating 
a regular C corporation in a manner similar to the way a partnership 
or an S corporation is treated under current law.83
83. Simplified rules for reporting the flow-through o f items for large partnerships 
have been proposed, first in the Tax Simplification Act o f 1991 and again in the Eco­
nomic Growth Acceleration Act of 1992 (H.R. 4210,102d Cong., 2d sess. Sec. 4301 
[1992]). These rules attempt to simplify the manner in which large partnerships com­
municate tax information to their partners. If enacted as proposed, these measures 
would make the flow-through method more attractive as an integration alternative.
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Fairness
Full integration should eliminate the vertical and horizontal ineq­
uities in the current system, because all corporate income items 
would be taxed once at the shareholder’s applicable tax rate. Horizon­
tal equity should result because the tax rate on corporate income 
would be the same as the rate applied to other sources o f income, 
whereas the use of a progressive tax system at the shareholder level 
achieves vertical equity.
Debt Versus Equity
Full integration would reduce the tax bias favoring debt financing 
over equity financing. Since both corporate earnings and interest 
income would be taxed only at the shareholder or creditor level, debt 
financing would not have the significant advantages over equity that 
it currently enjoys for tax purposes. On the other hand, to the extent 
that foreign and tax-exempt shareholders are fully taxed on their 
allocated income, debt financing may continue to be favored by 
such investors.
Retention of Earnings
Since the flow-through method taxes all income when earned, a 
corporation would not have a tax incentive to retain earnings at the 
corporate level. In fact, profitable corporations would be faced with 
the need to distribute some part of their earnings to cover share­
holder taxes imposed on the allocated income.
Ease of Administration
Full integration appears simple to implement, assuming that all 
earnings (ordinary and capital gains) are taxed at the same rate and all 
tax preferences are eliminated. Corporate tax preferences add 
complexity to the method because each item must be separately 
stated and treated correctly. The appearance of simplicity may be 
illusionary because o f the problems that surface under this method 
(these will be discussed later). In addition, corporations must main­
tain complex records to transmit accurately the required data to 
each shareholder.
A large publicly traded company would find it nearly impossible 
to report income determined on a daily basis to its numerous share­
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holders. Since a shareholder's basis would be increased or decreased 
by the allocated corporate income or loss, the calculation of a share­
holder’s basis for gains and losses also would become difficult if 
income could be properly allocated. Allocating a full year’s income to 
the shareholders of record at either the first or the last day o f the taxa­
ble year or at periodic intervals during the taxable year would provide 
one solution to this problem.84 In this way, because of the adjustments 
made to basis, the difference between the amount of income or loss 
that should have been allocated to a shareholder and the amount 
actually reported on the shareholder’s income tax return would be 
approximately offset at the time of sale of the shares of stock. As long 
as the ordinary income and capital gains tax rates are approximately 
the same, the difference in tax effect should be minimal (but only if 
capital losses are fully deductible). The current limitations on capital 
losses cause a problem if the shareholder recognizes a loss on the 
stock sale.85
International
To ensure that corporate income is subject to at least one level o f 
tax, the United States would need to impose a withholding tax on 
income earned by foreign shareholders. However, a withholding tax 
would require the renegotiation o f most existing tax treaties. The 
withholding tax could be reduced or eliminated for foreign share­
holders if the shareholder’s country of residence were to provide 
reciprocal treaty benefits to U.S. shareholders. Providing reciprocal 
benefits under the flow-through method could be difficult because 
this method has not been adopted in any other country.
84. This method of allocating income could create market distortions at the time 
income is reported as taxable. It could also lead to income-shifting strategies unless 
special anti-abuse rules were adopted.
85. Under the current system, if the shareholder has no other capital gains, the loss 
would be limited to $3,000 per year for individual shareholders and totally dis­
allowed for corporate shareholders, possibly causing a significant tax effect for 
either type of shareholder.
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Tax-Exempt Organizations
Since tax-exempt shareholders do not currently pay tax on their 
dividend income, the flow-through method could cause substantial 
amounts o f corporate income to escape taxation if income allocated 
to tax-exempt shareholders was not taxed. This issue could be 
addressed by either requiring corporations to withhold a nonrefund- 
able percentage of the income allocated to tax-exempt organizations 
or taxing the income allocated to tax-exempt shareholders as 
unrelated trade or business income. Taxing the allocated income as 
unrelated trade or business income would create a distinction 
between the taxation o f earnings on equity investment and the taxa­
tion of earnings on debt investment. It is unclear to what extent this 
different tax treatment would result in portfolio shifts by tax-exempt 
organizations.
Corporate Tax Preferences
A decision would have to be made about whether to pass corpo­
rate tax preferences through to shareholders under the flow-through 
method. The pass-through of tax preferences would create added 
complexities and would also raise tax policy issues. For example, the 
deemed-paid foreign tax credit under IRC Section 902 currently is 
allowed only to 10 percent corporate shareholders.
Retained Earnings
The flow-through method extends integration benefits to 
retained earnings by increasing the shareholder's basis by the amount 
of the corporations income, both distributed and undistributed. 
Thus, the gain on the sale o f stock attributable to retained taxable 
income is offset by the basis adjustment.
Intercorporate Dividends
The dividends-received deduction allowed under current law 
should be eliminated under this method, since intercorporate 
income is taxed only at the final level. Intercorporate earnings would 
be passed through and reported in a manner similar to the way 
income within tiered partnerships is reported under current law. 
Tracking o f all income and tax prepayments (if applicable) would be 
required to ensure that corporate income is properly reported. How­
ever, tracking income through a tiered corporate structure adds 
complexity to the method.
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State Taxation
Under the flow-through method, the computation o f federal tax­
able income for corporations need not be affected.86 If adopted, a 
state method of integration could result in numerous state filings by 
shareholders, which would increase the complexity o f the method. 
Shareholders could be taxed in the states in which the corporation 
does business, as in the current method of taxing partnership income 
that some states employ. Inconsistencies in integration methods 
among states also would increase complexity.
The potential exists for a substantial loss o f revenue under this 
method. Several factors must be considered in determining whether 
a states tax revenue would increase or decrease if integration were 
adopted.87 These factors include the average corporate tax rate 
(whether it is higher or lower than the average individual rate), state 
and federal taxes (whether they are deductible when computing state 
taxable income), the corporate dividend payout rate, and the redistri­
bution o f income from corporations to shareholders.
Level of Compliance
The flow-through method may not have as high a compliance rate 
as the shareholder-credit method, because it relies on the share­
holders to report all income. This problem could be solved by the 
inclusion of a prepayment mechanism that would require the corpo­
ration to pay a tax on all earnings, whether or not distributed. 
Shareholders would be allowed a credit for the prepaid tax. This 
process would ensure greater compliance, since the corporation, not 
the shareholder, would pay the tax.
Changes to Prior Income
Changes made to a corporations taxable income for prior years 
(for example, as a result o f an IRS audit or the filing of an amended 
tax return) create another problem under the flow-through method. 
A change in corporate income could affect numerous shareholder 
income tax returns for prior years. Some of these shareholders may no
86. The calculation o f taxable income under this method resembles the calculation 
for S corporations in which taxable income does not change but the taxpayer is sub­
ject to tax.
87. See the discussion o f reallocation o f income on pages 22 and 23.
47
longer own shares o f the corporation when the changes are made. 
This problem could be solved by requiring the current shareholders 
to report any changes in a prior year's income in the current year. 
Having current shareholders report income from a prior period in 
which they may not have owned any stock may be justifiable, assum­
ing the market price o f stock reflects a contingent tax liability for 
potential changes in corporate taxable income. Another possible 
solution would require the corporation, not the shareholders, to pay 
any additional taxes.
Net Operating Losses
Under the flow-through method, there are three alternatives to 
deducting net operating losses. The shareholder could (1) be allowed 
to deduct losses in full without any limitations, (2) be allowed to 
deduct losses limited to the shareholder’s basis in the stock, or (3) not 
be allowed to deduct losses at all. If there are no limitations on the 
deduction of corporate losses, numerous issues similar to those that 
arose with respect to tax shelters would need to be addressed.
Different Classes of Stock
The increased use of preferred stock, stock options, and stock 
warrants has made the capital structure of many corporations very 
complex. Multiple classes o f stock make the implementation of the 
flow-through method difficult because of the complexity o f calculat­
ing income allocations between classes o f stock. For example, alloca­
tion and tracking issues could arise if corporations retained earnings 
allocated to common stockholders and subsequently used these 
earnings to pay preferred dividends.
Cash Flow
If the corporation retains a substantial amount of earnings and if 
there is no prepayment of shareholder tax by the corporation or the 
prepayment rate is lower than the shareholder’s marginal tax rate, a 
shareholder cash flow problem could arise because the flow-through 
method taxes all corporate income, whether or not distributed. 
Depending on the prepayment rate (if any) and the level o f distribu­
tions, shareholders could incur a tax liability in excess o f cash 
received from the corporation.
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Taxable Year
As with partnerships and S corporations, when the tax year-end 
for the corporation and the shareholder differs, a potential for tax 
deferral exists. The system could allow corporations to adopt or retain 
fiscal year-ends with certain restrictions, but such a provision would 
further complicate the method.
Transition
Since the flow-through method would tax corporate income 
when earned, shareholders would not be subject to tax when such 
income was distributed. Special provisions may be needed to account 
for distributions made out o f earnings accumulated prior to the 
enactment o f integration. To ensure that only one level o f tax is paid 
on all income, shareholders would be required to adjust the basis o f 
their stock by their share o f income, losses, and distributions. This 
basis adjustment would be similar to the current adjustments made 
by partners and S corporation shareholders.88
Advantages and Disadvantages
The following are the advantages of the flow-through method:
• It permits both distributed income and retained earnings to 
receive integration benefits.
• It achieves horizontal and vertical equity.
• It reduces the bias between debt and equity.
The following are. its disadvantages:
• It requires maintenance o f complex records to transmit substan­
tial data to shareholders.
• Its complexity increases when corporate tax preferences are 
passed through to shareholders.
• It presents difficulties in allocating income to owners o f different 
classes o f stock and to shares disposed o f during the year.
• It causes complications when changes are made to prior-year 
income amounts.
88. IRC Sections 705 and 1367.
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• It creates cash flow problems for shareholders if corporations do 
not distribute sufficient amounts to fund their tax liabilities.
• It raises compliance problems unless the system implements a 
withholding mechanism.
Dividends-Paid Deduction Method
The dividends-paid deduction method allows the corporation a 
deduction for dividends paid, while taxing shareholders when they 
receive distributions. Under this method, the corporation enjoys the 
direct benefit from the elimination o f corporate tax on distributed 
income. In theory, this method would allow corporations to increase 
their dividend payments if they did not totally reinvest the tax 
savings.89
Fairness and Debt Versus Equity
To the extent that earnings are distributed, a single tax would 
result at the shareholder's progressive tax rates, ensuring horizontal 
and vertical equity at the level o f corporate distributions. Since this 
method treats dividends virtually the same as it treats interest, it 
should substantially eliminate the tax bias toward debt.
Retention of Earnings
Under the dividends-paid deduction method, the corporation 
receives the integration benefit directly in the form of reduced cor­
porate tax, which in turn increases funds available for investment 
(assuming there is no increase in dividends paid). This corporate- 
level tax benefit reduces the tax incentive to retain earnings.
89. Assuming a corporation has a taxable income of $200 and requires an earnings 
retention o f $40, under the current tax system that corporation could make a 
dividend distribution of $92.00 ($200 income -  $68 tax -  $40 retained earnings) 
under the current tax system. In contrast, if the corporation could deduct dividend 
payments and continue to retain the same amount of earnings, dividend distribu­
tions would equal approximately $140 ($200 income -  [$200 income -  $140 
dividend x 34 percent tax] -  $40 retained earnings).
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Ease of Administration
The dividends-paid deduction method is the simplest form of 
integration because its implementation affects only the corporation. 
However, without any special provisions, this method would allow 
some corporate profits to completely escape taxation, since a deduc­
tion is automatically granted for all dividends paid, including those to 
foreign residents and tax-exempt organizations. A withholding 
mechanism (nonrefundable with respect to dividends paid to foreign 
and tax-exempt shareholders) that requires a corporation to withhold 
a fixed percentage of the distributed income would permit this 
income to be taxed.90 However, a withholding mechanism would add 
significant complexity to the method.
International
Foreign shareholders usually benefit from a substantial reduction 
in withholding taxes under U.S. tax treaties. Under the dividends- 
paid deduction method, these reduced rates would cause corporate 
income to be subject to less than a full single level o f tax. To compen­
sate for the reduced tax, the United States would have to increase the 
withholding rates on dividends. Increasing withholding rates would 
require many treaties to be renegotiated.
The dividends-paid deduction method also differs from the 
methods adopted by other countries. This difference would compli­
cate the ability o f the United States to negotiate reciprocal integration 
benefits with other countries.91
90. A withholding mechanism would involve policy considerations relating to 
whether tax-exempt organizations should receive full or partial benefits, thus 
extending their current advantageous position as compared with taxable entities. In 
addition, there would be both policy and treaty considerations relating to whether 
foreign shareholders should receive full or partial benefits.
91. For example, if the United States allowed a 100 percent dividends-paid deduc­
tion, under many existing tax treaties, a foreign shareholder in a U.S. corporation 
could receive a distribution of $100 of pretax corporate income subject to only a $5 
withholding tax based on the reduced treaty withholding rate of 5 percent. Cur­
rently, a similar distribution to a foreign shareholder would be subject to a $34 
corporate-level tax, plus a $3.30 withholding tax on the net $66 distribution. To 
deny this windfall benefit to the foreign shareholder and subject the distribution to 
the present overall tax rate, the treaty would need to be renegotiated to provide a 
37.3 percent withholding rate on the dividend. At the same time, the United States 
would want to maintain the existing reciprocal 5 percent treaty rate on dividends 
paid by foreign corporations to U.S. shareholders. The ability of the United States 
to negotiate this result is doubtful.
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Tax-Exempt Organizations
Absent special treatment for dividends paid to tax-exempt share­
holders, a portion of a corporation s earnings would not be subject to 
any income tax. If this is not the desired result, dividends paid to 
tax-exempt shareholders could be treated as unrelated trade or 
business income or a withholding mechanism could be imple­
mented. Either approach would complicate the administration o f the 
method. If withholding is adopted, the amount of tax withheld that is 
attributable to tax-exempt shareholders would have to be treated as a 
nonrefundable credit. It is not clear to what extent this would cause 
a portfolio shift from equity to debt.
Corporate Tax Preferences
If a full dividend deduction were allowed against corporate 
income, as reduced by preferences, this method would be relatively 
simple to administer. However, if corporate tax preferences were 
passed through to shareholders, the amount of the distributions 
attributable to preference items would have to be excluded from the 
shareholder's income. Alternatively, taxing shareholders on the full 
amount of all distributions would limit the pass-through of prefer­
ences. If corporate tax preferences are not allowed to be passed 
through to shareholders, the corporation loses some of the benefit of 
the integration system because earnings must be retained by the cor­
poration to maximize the use of preferences.
Retained Earnings
The dividends-paid deduction method is designed to provide 
integration benefits only with respect to distributed income. How­
ever, the method could be modified to extend benefits to retained 
earnings by allowing shareholders to adjust the basis of their stock by 
the amount of retained earnings allocated to the stock, in a manner 
similar to the flow-through method. This alternative would add sig­
nificant complexity to implementation of the method and could be 
impracticable if it also required shareholders to report in income the 
retained earnings allocated to their stock.
Intercorporate Dividends
If corporations are allowed a full deduction for dividends paid, 
corporate shareholders should not be allowed a deduction for divi­
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dends received. Therefore, the dividends-received deduction would 
need to be eliminated to avoid duplicate deductions by both the 
payor and the payee of intercorporate dividends.
State Taxation
Federal adoption of the dividends-paid deduction method need 
not significantly affect state tax administration. States that wish to 
adopt a method o f integration could use federal taxable income. 
However, employing this method at the state level would generally 
redirect the incidence of tax from the state o f corporate business 
activity to the state o f shareholder residence. On the other hand, if 
states did not adopt integration, the computation of state taxable 
income would need to be adjusted for the amount of the federal 
dividends-paid deduction.
Level of Compliance
Unless the dividends-paid deduction method included a with­
holding mechanism coupled with a shareholder credit, the risk of 
noncompliance would be greater with this method than with other 
methods. If withholding were required, corporations would deduct 
and then remit to the government a fixed percentage of all dividends 
before distributing the remainder to the shareholders. Although the 
level o f compliance would increase with a withholding mechanism, 
the added complexity and administrative recordkeeping require­
ments would reduce or eliminate the major advantage of this method.
Changes to Prior Income
Any changes in a corporations prior years’ tax liability (for exam­
ple, by IRS audit or amended tax returns) should present less o f a 
problem under this method. Since the corporation enjoys all the 
benefits o f integration, any changes made affect only one taxpayer. 
Furthermore, because changes to income do not normally affect 
distributions, the deduction allowed to the corporation should not 
be altered.
Transition
In the transition to a dividends-paid deduction method, several 
issues would need to be considered. These issues include whether
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integration benefits would apply to existing equity investments, to 
preenactment earnings, or to both. Limiting integration to post­
enactment equity or earnings would add additional complexity to the 
operation of this method.
Advantages and Disadvantages
The following are the advantages of the dividends-paid deduc­
tion method:
It allows for ease in administration.
It achieves both horizontal and vertical equity at the shareholder 
level.
It reduces or eliminates the inequity between debt and equity. 
It increases after-tax cash flow to the corporation.
The following are its disadvantages:
It grants relief only to distributed earnings.
It grants all tax benefits at the corporate level.
It grants the full benefit o f integration with respect to distribu­
tions on stock regardless o f the tax status of shareholders.
It becomes more complicated to administer if the system limits 
corporate tax preferences.
It does not easily interface with foreign integration systems.
It requires many current foreign tax treaties to be renegotiated.
Shareholder-Credit Method
The shareholder-credit method achieves integration by allowing 
shareholders a credit against the tax imposed on dividend income. 
Under this method, the corporation would continue to pay tax on its 
earnings. Shareholders would gross up their incomes by the amount 
of tax paid by the corporation that is attributable to distributed earn­
ings. Shareholders would receive a credit for their portion of the tax 
allocated to dividends.
The tax relief would be entirely at the shareholder level. Theo­
retically, this relief would allow corporations to decrease dividend 
payouts, because shareholders would require fewer actual cash 
dividends to receive the same after-tax benefits. On the other hand,
54
shareholders might put additional pressure on corporations to main­
tain their dividend distribution levels so that they could receive a 
larger benefit from the credit.
Fairness
The shareholder-credit method achieves horizontal equity by tax­
ing distributed income only once, at the shareholder tax rates. If the 
method allowed the credit to be taken against tax imposed on other 
income or to be refunded, vertical equity also would result because 
all distributed income would be taxed at the progressive individual 
tax rates.
Debt Versus Equity
For investors who are subject to income tax, equity should 
become relatively more attractive because o f the tax credit that 
accompanies dividend income. For these shareholders, therefore, this 
method should reduce the existing bias in favor o f debt investment. 
However, corporations may still prefer debt financing because of its 
favored tax treatment at the corporate level.
Retention of Earnings
The availability o f a credit to offset all or a part o f the shareholder- 
level tax on corporate distributions would reduce the tax incentive for 
retaining earnings at the corporate level.
Ease of Administration
A shareholder-credit system would be relatively easy to 
administer if a fixed-rate credit were used.92 However, if the credit 
was based on the effective tax rate o f each separate corporation, it 
would be more complicated to administer. Moreover, the method
92. The 1992 Treasury Report does not recommend adoption of the shareholder- 
credit method, primarily on the grounds of its presumed complexity, even though 
the report acknowledges that the credit method is the most flexible in terms of 
responding to such important policy issues as the treatment of tax preferences, tax- 
exempt investors, and foreign shareholders. The report concludes that the principal 
complexity o f the credit method is that it requires an entirely new regime for taxing 
corporate distributions, wherein shareholders would be required to apply credits in 
determining their tax liabilities.
55
would be further complicated if special rules were included for for­
eign shareholders, tax-exempt entities, and tax preferences.93
The disposition o f stock during the year would not cause prob­
lems, since the credit would be claimed by the shareholder who 
received the dividend. If the shareholder credit did not change the 
shareholder s basis in the investment, the gain or loss on the sale of 
stock would be calculated in the same manner as under the current 
system.94
International
The ability of the shareholder-credit system to differentiate 
among special shareholders is one of the major advantages o f this 
method. For example, foreign taxpayers could receive the share­
holder credit if the shareholder s country of residence were to make 
reciprocal treaty concessions. Most foreign countries have adopted a 
shareholder-credit method. Therefore, the adoption of a similar 
method by the United States should simplify the interface between 
the U.S. and foreign systems, facilitating the granting of reciprocal 
integration benefits.
In the case of foreign-source income earned by domestic corpora­
tions, a decision would have to be made about whether to pass the 
benefit o f foreign tax credits through to shareholders. If the benefit of 
foreign tax credits were passed through to shareholders, the system 
would become more difficult to administer and would incur a greater 
revenue loss.
Tax-Exempt Organizations
Special treatment of tax-exempt shareholders would be easier to 
address under the shareholder-credit system. If it was determined 
that an advantage was to be given to tax-exempt shareholders, the 
credit would need to be fully or partially refundable. On the other 
hand, because the credit would be nonrefundable and not available
93. The 1992 Treasury Report preferred the dividend-exclusion method to any 
form of the shareholder-credit method because of simplification concerns.
94. Taylor and Aidinoff, in “Approaches to Debt: Is Integration the Answer?,” 
suggest that basis adjustments similar to those made for partnerships and S 
corporations may be appropriate. However, they acknowledge that such adjust­
ments may be too complex for publicly held corporations.
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for offset against unrelated trade or business income tax, at least one 
level o f tax would be imposed on all corporate income.
Corporate Tax Preferences
Although the possibility o f complexity does exist in this system, 
the shareholder credit should allow flexibility in addressing the issue 
of corporate tax preferences.95 Tax preferences could be passed 
through to the shareholders by means o f a fixed rate o f credit on all 
dividends. However, if the pass-through of preferences was not 
desired, a compensatory tax could be levied at the corporate level and 
a fixed rate o f credit could be maintained for the shareholders. Alter­
natively, the corporation s effective tax rate as it varies from year to 
year could be used as the rate of credit, but this would add significant 
complexity to tax planning at the shareholder level because the share­
holder would need to be informed of the amount of credit associated 
with each distribution.
Retained Earnings
The shareholder-credit method is designed to provide integration 
benefits for distributed income. However, the method could be modi­
fied to extend benefits to retained earnings. One approach would 
couple the adoption of the method with the elimination o f the tax on 
stock sales. This alternative, however, would also grant integration 
benefits to unrealized corporate income. Another approach would 
adjust shareholder stock basis by the amount of retained earnings 
allocated to the stock in a manner similar to the flow-through 
method. This alternative would extend the benefits only to retained 
earnings; however, it also would add significant complexity to the 
implementation of this method.
Intercorporate Dividends
If the dividends-received deduction were not repealed, corpora­
tions would receive a double benefit, being allowed both a deduction 
and a credit for the dividends received. To avoid this double benefit,
95. This method is more flexible because it could be designed to select which 
corporate tax preferences would be passed through to the shareholder. As in the 
Australian system, not all tax preferences need to receive integration benefits 
each year.
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corporate shareholders entitled to the shareholder credit should not 
be entitled to a dividends-received deduction.
State Taxation
Federal adoption o f a shareholder-credit method should not 
affect state corporate tax administration, because the corporate taxa­
ble income base does not change. However, if states did not adopt 
integration, adjustments would be needed to eliminate the gross-up 
of the credit at the shareholder level. Complexities or loss o f revenue 
could arise under the shareholder-credit method if states do adopt 
integration.
Level of Compliance
A shareholder-credit system would probably enjoy a high level of 
taxpayer compliance because the shareholder must report the divi­
dend income before the credit can be claimed. Therefore, share­
holders would have an incentive to report income, particularly if the 
credit could be offset against taxes on other income or is refundable.
Changes to Prior Income
Adjustment made to a corporations prior-year tax liability (for 
example, because o f an IRS audit or the filing o f an amended tax 
return) should not cause problems if there is a fixed rate o f credit. 
Since changes in a prior year's tax liability will not change the fixed 
rate, the credit should not be affected. However, if the method 
computes the credit on the basis o f each corporations effective tax 
rate, and if corporate adjustments were to change the effective tax 
rate, difficulties could arise, since a corresponding change in the 
credit rate would occur. The change in the credit would require 
recomputation in the tax liability o f all the corporation s shareholders, 
a process that could be overwhelming to administer. Most other 
countries that have adopted a shareholder-credit system of integra­
tion have avoided this problem by using a flat rate for the credit.
Transition
Several transitional issues would need to be considered in adopt­
ing a shareholder-credit method. These issues include whether 
credits would be imputed to existing equity investments and whether
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credits would be granted for distributions of pre-enactment earnings. 
Limiting credits only to holders o f newly issued equity or to distribu­
tions only from post-enactment earnings would add complexities to 
the implementation of the method.
Advantages and Disadvantages
The following are the advantages of the shareholder-credit 
method:
It allows for easy implementation when a fixed credit rate is used. 
It interfaces easily with systems in other countries.
Its administration benefits from international experience.
It adapts easily and is more flexible than other methods.
It simplifies denial o f benefits to special categories o f share­
holders.
It ensures a high level o f compliance.
It provides integration benefits at the shareholder level.
It creates no problems when a prior year’s tax liability is adjusted, 
if a fixed credit rate is used.
The following are its disadvantages:
• It introduces complexities when a credit rate other than a fixed 
rate is used.
• It does not pass through corporate tax preferences if the credit 
rate equals the corporations effective tax rate.
Other Methods
Three other methods that have been studied are the repeal of 
corporate tax, the split-rate corporate-level tax, and the dividend- 
exclusion method. These three methods are variations o f the 
flow-through, dividends-paid deduction, and shareholder-credit 
methods, respectively. As discussed below, careful consideration of 
these three methods reveals that they are not as effective or flexible 
as their principal counterparts in implementing integration o f the 
corporate and individual tax systems. Therefore, the AICPA does not 
recommend that any of these methods of integration be adopted.
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Repeal of the Corporate Tax
Integration can be achieved by repealing the corporate income 
tax but continuing to tax shareholders on distributions o f corporate 
earnings. Repealing the corporate tax would produce results similar 
to the flow-through method in that the tax burden would be borne 
entirely at the shareholder level. The principal difference, however, is 
that the repeal of the corporate tax would require that shareholders 
report income only when corporate earnings are distributed. Under 
the flow-through method, corporate earnings would be taxed cur­
rently at the shareholder level whether or not distributed.
Although repealing the corporate tax would greatly simplify the 
tax system, it also would encourage corporations to accumulate 
earnings, leading to some o f the same disadvantages and complex 
anti-abuse provisions that exist in the current system, such as the 
accumulated earnings tax and the personal holding company tax.
Split-Rate Corporate-Level Tax
A split-rate tax method o f integration would allow corporations to 
pay a lower rate o f tax on distributed income than on earnings 
retained at the corporate level. This method has virtually the same 
characteristics as a dividends-paid deduction method; however, it 
would provide only a partial benefit for the amount o f dividends paid.
A split-rate tax would not entirely eliminate the distinction 
between debt and equity, because the system would not treat the 
deduction for interest expense the same as dividend payments. How­
ever, the differences between debt and equity could be narrowed. 
Because distributed earnings would receive preferential tax treat­
ment, corporations might be pressured to make larger distributions. 
Tax-exempt and foreign shareholders would receive no special 
benefits under this system. The same complexities that would arise 
under the dividends-paid deduction method for both foreign tax 
credits and other corporate tax preferences also would arise under 
this method. Because of the problems noted above, implementation 
o f such a method may not be advisable.
Dividend-Exclusion Method
The dividend-exclusion method would eliminate the double tax 
on distributed corporate income by allowing shareholders to exclude 
dividends from income. Income at the corporation level, however,
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would continue to be fully taxed. This method would produce results 
similar to a shareholder-credit method that neither allows refundable 
credits nor imposes a compensatory tax.
To limit tax-free dividend treatment to distributions paid out o f 
income that is fully taxed at the corporate level, the corporation 
would be required to track such income. Only dividends that were 
paid out o f fully taxed income would qualify for the exclusion at the 
shareholder level. This tracking of fully taxed income would be simi­
lar to the tracking mechanism required under a shareholder-credit 
method that limits the credit to taxes actually paid at the corporate 
level.
By taxing income fully at the corporate level, the dividend- 
exclusion method would achieve the same results with respect to 
tax-exempt and foreign shareholders and the pass-through of 
corporate tax preferences as a shareholder-credit method that 
allowed a nonrefundable credit based on the corporations effective 
tax rate. Also, like the shareholder-credit method, the dividend- 
exclusion method would not extend integration benefits to retained 
earnings unless special provisions were adopted.
Although the dividend-exclusion method and the shareholder- 
credit method would produce substantially equivalent results, the 
credit method was found to be preferable for several reasons. First, 
the credit method would achieve horizontal and vertical equity 
because corporate income would be taxed at the shareholder's tax 
rate, whereas the dividend-exclusion method would tax income at the 
corporations tax rate, and therefore would not achieve one of the 
basic objectives o f integration (i.e., uniform taxation of income 
earned in the corporate and noncorporate sectors). Moreover, the 
dividend-exclusion method would discriminate against low-bracket 
shareholders, who would be taxed on distributed corporate profits at 
the same effective rate (zero percent) as high-bracket taxpayers.96
Currently, the lack of horizontal and vertical equity under a 
dividend-exclusion method is less significant because the present
96. T he 1992 Treasury Report suggests that i f  policym akers desire to tax dis­
tributed corporate in com e at shareholder rates, the dividend-exclusion  m ethod 
cou ld  be  structured to allow a tax credit that w ould refund all or part o f  the excess 
tax co llected  on  corporate in com e distributed to low -bracket shareholders. This 
solution w ould  seem  to b e  tantamount to the adoption o f  a shareholder credit. See 
Richard G oode, “ Integration o f  Corporate and Individual Taxes: A  Treasury 
Report,” Tax Notes (M arch 30, 1992), 1668.
61
corporate and highest individual tax rates are approximately equal. 
However, these rate structures could be changed by future legisla­
tion. In such an event, the adoption of the shareholder-credit method 
would allow corporate profits to be taxed at the same rate as profits 
earned in the noncorporate sector.
A second advantage of the shareholder-credit method is that it 
would more easily interface with the many integrated foreign tax 
systems that have adopted the credit method. This comparability 
between a U.S. integrated system and foreign integrated systems 
would facilitate treaty negotiations on obtaining reciprocal integra­
tion benefits for U.S. shareholders.
Finally, the shareholder-credit method should be no more com­
plicated to implement and administer than a dividend-exclusion 
method.97 In fact, if the shareholder-credit method were to employ 
either a flat-rate credit or a compensatory tax, it might be less compli­
cated to administer than the dividend-exclusion method.
97. T he 1992 Treasury R eport advocates the adoption o f  the dividend-exclusion 
m ethod  rather than the shareholder-credit m ethod because o f  its sim plicity and 
ease o f  administration. However, in its report, the Treasury com pares the dividend- 
exclusion m ethod with the credit m ethod  adopted by N ew  Zealand in 1988. The 
N ew  Zealand m ethod is arguably the m ost com plicated  form  o f  the credit m ethod.
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Conclusions and 
Recommendations
Each o f the three principal methods has been evaluated to deter­
mine whether it achieves five basic objectives for an integrated sys­
tem and whether and how easily it can be designed to handle certain 
key issues. Each of these principal methods would achieve more neu­
tral taxation by (1) providing more uniform taxation of income 
between the corporate and noncorporate sectors; (2) reducing the tax 
bias favoring debt investment; and (3) reducing the incentives to 
retain rather than distribute earnings. Accordingly, the AICPA 
believes that an integration method must be chosen primarily on the 
basis o f its ease o f administration, its compatibility with foreign 
integrated systems, and its flexibility in addressing the key issues of 
tax preferences, tax-exempt investors, and international transactions.
Theoretically, the flow-through method is the purest form of 
integration; however, it would be considerably more difficult to 
administer and implement. Broadening the eligibility o f the S corpo­
ration election by expanding the number of allowable shareholders 
would offer one alternative to the use of the flow-through method, 
but the use of the S corporation rules would not be practical for large, 
widely held corporations.98 Moreover, if policymakers were to decide
98. While the existing flow-through integration method now applicable to S corpo­
rations may deal appropriately with the greatest number o f corporations, it is not 
practicable for larger, publicly held corporations. Although expansion of S corpora­
tion eligibility would be beneficial, another integration method must be adopted 
for large corporations if the benefits of integration are to be extended to that sector 
of the American economy.
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not to extend integration benefits to tax-exempt and foreign share­
holders, the flow-through method would need to include an 
appropriate withholding mechanism, further complicating imple­
mentation o f the method. After careful review, the flow-through 
method was not chosen as a viable option because of the numerous 
problems in administering the method, its lack of flexibility in dealing 
with the key issues, and its incompatibility with foreign integrated 
systems.
Both of the other two alternatives, the dividends-paid deduction 
and the shareholder-credit methods, would offer a more practical and 
realistic means of achieving integration. The publics perception of 
the equity o f each method may be an important factor in determining 
whether either is adopted. The public may perceive that the 
dividends-paid deduction method would confer all of the benefits on 
the corporation. The shareholder-credit method is likely to be more 
acceptable, since the public may perceive that the shareholder would 
receive a greater benefit than under the current system or the 
dividends-paid deduction method. On the other hand, the public 
may perceive that integration benefits only high-income taxpayers.
The United States could adopt either the deduction or the credit 
method with substantially the same tax results.99 However, to achieve 
this equality, it must be assumed that the corporate-dividend policy 
would be comparable under both methods. In addition, the deduc­
tion method would be assumed to include a withholding mechanism 
and credits under both methods would be refundable.
99. For example:
Credit Deductions
Corporate Level
N et in com e $1,000 $1,000
Cash dividend 660 1,000
D ividend deduction 0 1,000
Taxable in com e 1,000 0
C orporate tax (3 4 % ) 340 0
W ithholding tax (31% ) 0 310
Shareholder Level
Cash dividend received $ 660 $ 690
Gross-up inclusion 340 310
Shareholder in com e 1,000 1,000
Tax before  credit 310 310
C redit 340 310
Refundable credit (30) 0
N et Cash to Shareholder $ 690 $ 690
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Proponents of the dividends-paid deduction method argue that 
(1) it is simpler and easier to administer than the shareholder-credit 
system, (2) it handles the debt-equity problem more effectively, and 
(3) it can more easily restrict integration benefits to new equity. The 
simplicity and ease of administration of the dividends-paid deduction 
method is its most significant advantage. However, the modifications 
(including withholding) required to implement adjustments for for­
eign and tax-exempt shareholders, credits, and tax preferences would 
complicate this method greatly. Without these modifications, greater 
revenue loss, reduced compliance, and a decrease in the value of tax 
preferences could result. Consequently, such a modified deduction 
method would provide no significant advantages over a shareholder- 
credit method.
Another advantage of the dividends-paid deduction method is 
that it would provide for more neutral tax treatment o f debt and 
equity. The shareholder-credit method would not achieve the same 
result, since the shareholders, not the corporation, would receive the 
benefits o f integration. Therefore, under the credit method, corpora­
tions may continue to prefer debt because interest would be deducti­
ble, whereas dividends would not.
Proponents o f the shareholder-credit method argue that it is 
preferable to the dividends-paid deduction method because (1) it 
would achieve a higher level o f compliance with less effort, (2) it 
would be more flexible in dealing with foreign and tax-exempt share­
holders and corporate tax preferences, (3) it would more easily 
conform to the integrated systems of other countries, and (4) it would 
not affect the corporation s financial statements.
The shareholder-credit method should have a higher level o f 
compliance than the dividends-paid deduction method, unless the 
deduction method includes a withholding mechanism. The level o f 
compliance would be higher under the credit method because tax­
payers would report dividend income before receiving the benefit o f 
the credit, whereas under the deduction method, the corporation 
would be permitted to take a deduction for dividends even if some 
shareholders failed to report the dividend income.
The shareholder-credit method can more easily be designed 
either to extend or to limit benefits for foreign and tax-exempt share­
holders, and either to pass through or to limit the pass-through o f tax 
preferences to shareholders. Although the deduction method, too, 
can be designed to address these issues, the credit system would 
handle them with far less complexity. A special provision for corpo­
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rate tax preferences would make both methods more complex, but 
implementation of rules relating to tax preferences would be more 
difficult under the dividends-paid deduction method.
If policymakers decide not to extend integration benefits to tax- 
exempt shareholders, the shareholder-credit method could make the 
credit nonrefundable to tax-exempt organizations, whereas the 
dividends-paid deduction method would have to tax dividends as 
unrelated trade or business income (or include a withholding mecha­
nism) to achieve the same result. Making the credit nonrefundable is 
easier to implement, and certainly less complex, than requiring 
withholding or taxing dividends as unrelated trade or business 
income.
The shareholder-credit method also can be more easily tailored 
to other specific types o f shareholders. This feature is especially 
important when determining the proper treatment of foreign share­
holders, and may be the reason why other countries have preferred 
the shareholder-credit instead of the deduction method.100 Con­
versely, the main drawback to the dividends-paid deduction method 
is that it would apply to all categories o f shareholders equally. Under 
the credit method, the United States could make the credit 
nonrefundable to foreign shareholders and extend integration 
benefits to foreign shareholders only through bilateral treaty negotia­
tions. The only way to prevent the granting of integration benefits to 
foreign shareholders under the deduction method would be to 
increase the withholding rate on dividends paid to such shareholders. 
However, such an increase could be very difficult, if not impossible, 
to achieve under the provisions o f many existing tax treaties.
Another advantage of the shareholder-credit system is that it 
would not change the amount of net income a corporation reports in 
its financial statements. Because the corporate income tax liability 
would not change under this method, there would be no consistency 
problems with reporting the prior year’s operations and cash flows, 
such as those that would occur under the deduction method.
International conformity, however, may be the most important 
advantage of the shareholder-credit method. All other major indus­
trialized nations that have adopted integration use this method. This 
international experience not only would benefit the United States in 
designing and implementing an integration system, it also would
100. See Avi-Yonah, “The Treatment o f  Corporate Preference Item s U nder an 
Integrated Tax System; A  Com parative Analysis,” 198.
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make it easier to interface the U.S. system with foreign systems. 
Adopting the shareholder-credit method also would facilitate 
bilateral treaty negotiations on providing reciprocal integration 
benefits.
In summary, since both the credit and deduction methods can be 
structured to produce substantially equivalent tax results, the United 
States should consider other advantages and disadvantages when 
selecting the appropriate method. The single most important factor 
in this decision seems to be the international ramifications, particu­
larly the method's ability to work within the framework o f bilateral tax 
treaties. Flexibility in treaty negotiations, particularly in dealing with 
foreign tax credits and the extension of integration benefits to foreign 
shareholders, would give the credit system a decisive advantage.
The shareholder credit also would allow for greater flexibility in 
handling the key policy issues involved in the treatment o f tax prefer­
ences and tax-exempt investors. This flexibility would facilitate the 
adoption o f an integrated system, because it would more easily allow 
policymakers to reach the compromises that necessarily are a part of 
the legislative process. Although some forms of the shareholder- 
credit method may be relatively complicated to implement, inter­
national experience suggests that even the most complex forms of the 
method can be administered without substantial difficulty.
On balance, the AICPA concludes that the shareholder-credit 
method best achieves the objectives o f an integrated system, and 
therefore recommends its adoption by the United States.
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Appendix A
Description of the 
Comprehensive 
Business Income Tax
The Comprehensive Business Incom e Tax (CBIT) prototype, recom ­
m ended in the Treasury report Integration o f  the Individual and C orporate 
Tax Systems, would virtually eliminate distinctions betw een debt and 
equity investment, and it would tax corporate and noncorporate businesses 
alike. Under CBIT, payments o f  interest or dividends would not be deduct­
ible by a C BIT entity,* but the payments would generally be excluded from 
the investor’s income. Thus, the incom e would be taxed at the C BIT entity’s 
rate and not at the progressive rates applicable to the individual recipients 
o f  the dividends or interest income.
The CBIT prototype is com prehensive in that it would apply to virtu­
ally all businesses† without regard to the legal form in which a business 
conducts its activities. Thus, corporations, S corporations, partnerships, 
and sole proprietorships would all be  subject to the same system o f  taxation.
Tax preference incom e would be  prevented from passing through to 
shareholders by means o f  an excludable distributions account (EDA). The 
EDA would track incom e that has been  fully taxed,‡ and distributions 
from the EDA would be excludable from the incom e o f  investors. Amounts 
distributed in excess o f  the EDA either would be subject to a com pensatory 
tax at the corporate level or would b e  taxable to the investors.
* CBIT entity in this context refers not only to corporations and partnerships but also to sole 
proprietorships that are subject to CBIT.
† There would be a small business exception for businesses with gross receipts o f less 
than $100,000.
‡ The annual addition to the EDA is calculated by the following formula: U.S. tax paid for the 
taxable year divided by the corporate tax rate, less U.S. tax paid for the taxable year, plus equity 
distributions and interest received from CBIT entities.
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Foreign-source incom e o f  the CBIT entity would continue to be  subject 
to the foreign tax credit. However, such incom e would b e  treated similarly 
to preference incom e, because foreign-source incom e that was not subject 
to U.S. tax as a result o f  receiving the benefit o f  the foreign tax credit would 
not increase the EDA. W ith regard to foreign investors in U.S. CBITs, the 
proposal would eliminate withholding on dividends and interest.
The CBIT proposal would not change the taxation o f  interest that was 
not paid by a C B IT  entity. Thus, hom e mortgage interest and investment 
interest would remain deductible.
Because all businesses would be subject to the same system o f  taxation, 
the reorganization provisions found in subchapter C would have to be 
extended to partnerships and sole proprietorships in order to provide for the 
carryover o f  ED A 's when entities are com bined. Distributions o f  appreciated 
property by partnerships and sole proprietorships would likely trigger entity- 
level taxable incom e and an increase in basis. Alternatively, som e provisions 
may be made for carryover basis with regard to such distributions.
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Appendix B
The Effect of
Corporate Distribution Levels 
on Effective Tax Rates 
Under Current Law and 
Alternative Tax 
Integration Methods
This appendix sets forth a com parison o f  the tax effect on corporate dis­
tribution levels under the current tax system and under three alternative 
integration m ethods —the flow-through m ethod, the dividends-paid 
deduction m ethod, and the shareholder-credit m ethod. The calculations 
reflect the current individual and corporate tax rate structure (31 percent 
and 34 percent, respectively).
In the current double-tax environment, effective tax rates on dis­
tributed incom e depend on the com bination o f  corporate and individual 
tax rates, as well as on the amount o f  incom e distributed. Assuming full 
retention o f  earnings by the corporation, the system levies a tax only at the 
corporate level (34 percent at current rates). The com bined shareholder- 
corporate tax increases to 44.23 percent when the corporation distributes 
50 percent o f  its earnings. W hen the corporation distributes all o f  its 
after-tax earnings, the com bined tax rate increases to 54.46 percent. This 
increase in effective tax rates demonstrates the current system’s bias 
against distributing corporate earnings.
The greatest change in effective tax rates from the current system 
would occu r under the flow-through m ethod o f  integration, because the 
effective tax rate under this m ethod (which is analogous to current partner­
ship and S corporation taxation) equals the shareholder tax rate irrespec­
tive o f  the amount o f  corporate distributions. Distributions do not affect 
the tax rate and therefore would be a neutral consideration from a tax-effect
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standpoint, other than as a source o f  funds wi th which to pay the tax. In 
addition, since this m ethod would tax all incom e at the shareholder level, 
the corporate tax would becom e unnecessary.
Somewhere between the effects o f  the double-tax system and the effects 
o f  the flow-through m ethod o f integration lie the effects o f  the dividends- 
paid deduction and the shareholder-credit methods, both o f  which result 
in the same effective tax rate in most situations. Under the latter two 
methods, the change in effective tax rates depends on the amount o f  
corporate distributions. The greater the level o f  distribution, the more the 
com bined effective tax rate shifts from the corporate rate to the share­
holder rate. The effective tax rate under both methods equals 34 percent 
when the corporation retains 100 percent o f  its earnings, the same rate as 
under the current system. Assuming the tax credit can be used to shelter 
tax on incom e other than the dividend on which the credit is earned, the 
com bined effective tax rate gravitates toward the shareholder tax rate in 
direct proportion to the level o f  distribution under either m ethod 
(for example, a 32.5 percent com bined effective tax rate assuming a 50 
percent level o f  distribution, and a 31 percent com bined effective tax rate 
assuming a 100 percent level o f  distribution).
I f  the shareholder credit cannot be used to offset tax on incom e other 
than the dividend itself, and the corporate tax rate exceeds the shareholder 
tax rate, the com bined effective tax rate would equal the corporate tax rate, 
notwithstanding the level o f  distribution. In this case, the dividends-paid 
deduction and the shareholder-credit methods will produce different 
effective tax rates.
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T a b le  B.1
S u m m a ry  C o m p a r is o n *
Effective Tax Rates
Full Full Flow-
After-Tax Income Present Dividend Shareholder Through
Distribution Percentage Law Deduction Credit Method
0% 3 4 % 3 4 % 3 4 % 3 1 %
5 0 % 44 .23% 32 .5% 34% † 3 1 %
100% 54 .46% 3 1 % 3 4 % ‡ 3 1 %
* This summary assumes the following:
Corporate tax rate 31%
Shareholder tax rate 31%
Corporate pretax income $1,000
† Assumes a nonrefundable credit. If shareholder credit is allowed to shelter tax on income 
from sources other than the dividend giving rise to credit, the effective tax rate is 32.5%.
‡ Assumes a nonrefundable credit. If shareholder credit is allowed to shelter tax on income 
from sources other than the dividend giving rise to credit, the effective tax rate is 31%.
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Table B.2
0%  Incom e Distribution
Full Full Flow-
Present Dividend Shareholder Through
Law Deduction Credit Method
Corporate Level
N et in com e 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
D ividends paid 0 0 0 0
D ividend deduction 0 0
Taxable incom e 1,000 1,000 1,000 0
Tax (3 4 % ) 340 340 340 0
Retained earnings 660 660 660 1,000
Individual Level
D ividends received 0 0 0 0
Gross-up 0
Taxable in com e 0 0 0 1,000
Tax before  credit (31% ) 0 0 0 310
C redit 0
Tax after credit 0 0 0 310
Total Tax W ith
Refundable C redit 340 340 340 310
Effective Rate W ith
Refundable Credit 34 .00% 34 .00% 34 .00% 31 .00%
Cash F low  to Individual
W ith Refundable C redit
D ividends paid 
to individual 
Tax to individual
0 0 0 0
after credits 0 0 0 310
Cash F low 0 0 0 (310)
Total Tax W ithout
Refundable C redit 340 340 340 310
E ffective Rate W ithout
Refundable Credit 34 .00% 34 .00% 34 .00% 31 .00%
Cash F low  to Individual
W ithout Refundable C redit
D ividends paid 
to individual 
Tax to individual
0 0 0 0
after credit 0 0 0 310
Cash F low 0 0 0 (310)
74
Table B.3
50% Incom e Distribution
Full Full Flow-
Present Dividend Shareholder Through
Law Deduction Credit Method
Corporate Level
N et in com e 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
D ividends paid 330 500 330 500
D ividend deduction 500 0
Taxable in com e 1,000 500 1,000 0
Tax (3 4 % ) 340 170 340 0
Retained earnings 330 330 330 500
Individual Level
D ividends received 330 500 330 500
Gross-up 170
Taxable in com e 330 500 500 1,000
Tax before  credit (31% ) 102 155 155 310
Credit 170 0
Tax after credit 102 155 (15) 310
Total Tax W ith
Refundable C redit 442 325 325 310
E ffective Rate W ith
Refundable Credit 44 .23% 32 .50% 32 .50% 31 .00%
Cash F low  to Individual
W ith Refundable C redit
D ividends paid 
to individual 
Tax to individual
330 500 330 500
after credits 102 155 (15) 310
Cash F low 228 345 345 190
Total Tax W ithout
Refundable C redit 442 325 340 310
Effective Rate W ithout
Refundable Credit 44 .23% 32 .50% 34 .00% 31 .00%
Cash F low  to Individual
W ithout Refundable C redit
D ividends paid 
to individual 
Tax to individual
330 500 330 500
after credits 102 155 0 310
Cash F low 228 345 330 190
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Table B.4
100% Incom e Distribution
Full Full Flow-
Present Dividend Shareholder Through
Law Deduction Credit Method
Corporate Level
N et in com e 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
D ividends paid 660 1,000 660 1,000
D ividend deduction 1,000 0
Taxable in com e 1,000 0 1,000 0
Tax (3 4 % ) 340 0 340 0
Retained earnings 0 0 0 0
Individual Level
D ividends received 660 1,000 660 1,000
Gross-up 340
Taxable in com e 660 1,000 1,000 1,000
Tax before  credit (31% ) 205 310 310 310
C redit 340 0
Tax after credit 205 310 (30) 310
Total Tax W ith
Refundable Credit 545 310 310 310
Effective Rate W ith
Refundable C redit 54 .46% 31 .00% 31 .00% 31 .00%
Cash F low  to Individual
W ith  Refundable C redit
D ividends paid 
to individual 
Tax to individual
660 1,000 660 1,000
after credits 205 310 (30) 310
Cash F low 445 690 690 690
Total Tax W ithout
Refundable C redit 545 310 340 310
Effective Rate W ithout
Refundable C redit 54 .46% 31 .00% 34 .00% 31 .00%
Cash F low  to Individual
W ithout Refundable C redit
D ividends paid 
to individual 
Tax to individual
660 1,000 660 1,000
after credits 205 310 0 310
Cash F low 455 690 660 690
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Appendix C
Degree of Reduction of 
Economic Double Taxation 
in OECD Countries
The following schedule was taken from Taxing Profits in a Global 
Economy: Domestic and International Issues, published by the Organiza­
tion o f  E conom ic Cooperation and D evelopm ent (January 1992), p. 57.
[Table begins on following page.]
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Appendix D
Characteristics of the 
Foreign Tax Systems 
for the Countries 
Included in the AlCPA Study
The following schedule presents the important characteristics o f  the 
corporate tax systems in Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, 
Germany, and Australia, Also included in the schedule are the individual 
incom e and capital gain tax rates and characteristics o f  the integration 
system adopted in each country.
[Schedule begins on following page.]
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Characteristics of Foreign Tax Systems 
(continued)
Table D.1
Notes:
A: The Canadian federal government imposes tax at the rate o f 28 % plus a surtax
of 3% of tax. Each of the provincial governments then levies tax on corporate 
income earned in the province, typically at about 15%, giving a combined rate of 
about 44%.
B: Unilateral relief by foreign tax credit; treaty relief by exclusion or rate reduction.
C: Income is combined with ordinary income, but only 75% of gain is included
in the tax base.
D: At the federal level, the shareholder credit is equal to 16.67% of dividends
received. When the reduction in provincial tax is taken into account, the total credit 
is about 25 % of the dividend received. The tax credit at the shareholder level does 
not, however, fully offset the tax paid by the corporation on the income.
E: 95% of gross dividend (i.e., net dividend plus tax credit in respect of foreign
withholding tax) from 10%-or-more-owned affiliates is exempt. Otherwise, foreign 
tax credit corresponding to foreign withholding tax only under treaty provisions.
F: Combined (i) for gains from sales of assets held less than two years, (ii) for
recapture o f depreciation, and (iii) for sale of some securities; separate for gains 
from sales o f assets held two years or more. Gains from sales o f assets held for more 
than two years are subject to taxation at an 18% rate. As a condition for the favorable 
treatment, a reserve must be booked for the after-tax capital gains (82%). If this 
reserve is subsequently distributed, the tax benefit of the reduced rate is recaptured.
G: Dividends are basically paid to shareholders out of after-tax profits. A tax
credit (avoir fiscal) is attached to the net dividend received by resident share­
holders, equal to 50% of that net dividend. However, under treaty provisions, the 
avoir fiscal tax credit can be attributed to nonresident shareholders (generally to 
individuals or nonparent corporations).
Shareholders are subject to individual or corporate income tax on the gross 
dividend (i.e., net dividend plus tax credit). The tax credit can then be offset against 
the shareholder's total tax liability.
For corporate shareholders, 95% of gross dividend received (net dividend plus tax 
credit) is exempt where the distributing company is owned 10% or more. This 
applies to both French-source and foreign-source dividends.
H: The avoir fiscal tax credit is refundable to pension funds and charitable organi­
zations recognized as fulfilling a public interest.
I: Generally, foreign shareholders do not benefit from the avoir fiscal tax credit,
except under treaty provisions. The tax credit can also be refundable under treaty 
provisions.
J: Precompte equalization tax is due by the distributing company upon distribu­
tion o f income on which corporate tax at 34% has not been levied (e.g., income 
from foreign permanent establishments or dividends from affiliates owned 10% or
84
more). Precompte tax is equal to the avoir fiscal tax credit. Tax credits attached to 
redistributed dividends (i.e., avoir fiscal or tax credits in respect of foreign with­
holding taxes under treaty provisions) can be offset against precompte tax.
K: Limited exemption for certain special-purpose bonds (e.g., low-income
housing bonds). Otherwise taxable.
L: Income received from affiliates owned 10% or more is exempt. Otherwise,
foreign tax credit.
M: Penalty taxes apply on distribution of exempt income. This funds credit given
to shareholder. Municipal trade tax (average rate approximately 17%, deductible 
for computing corporate tax) is not subject to corporate/shareholder tax integra­
tion; however, dividends received from 10%-or-more-owned subsidiaries are not 
subject to trade tax. Note that the exemption is only granted if the participation of 
10% or more has been held for a period of at least twelve months before the end 
of the fiscal year.
N: Tax credit and tax deduction o f 60% of the profits distributed to Italian corpo­
rations by related companies that are not resident in Italy and are owned for 
an amount not less than 20% of their capital stock (10% if such foreign companies 
are public-listed).
O: Equalization tax at the rate o f  56.25% (36/64) in case of distribution o f income
exempt from corporate income tax. This funds credit given to shareholder. Local 
income tax (ILOR) at a rate o f 16.2%, 75% o f which is deductible for corporation 
tax (IRPEG), is not subject to corporate/shareholder tax integration. Proposed 
legislation introduced in September 1992 would make local income tax nondeduct­
ible for corporate tax, effective for calendar year 1992.
P; Combined national and local tax rate.
Q: Unilateral relief by foreign tax credit, treaty relief by exclusion, rate reduction
or foreign tax credit.
R: A refund o f the credit is generally not available. A special relief is available, 
however, if a company is in a loss position and has surplus receipts of U.K. dividends. 
The company “deposits” the loss with the Revenue and the Revenue pays the credit 
to the company. When the company pays dividends in the future, ACT is paid, 
which effectively repays the tax credit, and the losses are reinstated.
S: Generally not refundable but by treaty may be refunded subject to application
of withholding tax on refund and underlying dividend. U.S.-U.K. treaty provides 
full ACT refund to U.S. individual and less-than-10% corporate shareholders with 
15% withholding tax; corporate 10%-or-more shareholders receive ACT refund of 
one-half with 5% withholding tax.
T: The normal rate of corporation tax for companies with profits greater than£1.25
million is 33 %; however, a special rate, known as the small companies rate, is availa­
ble for companies with profits of less than £250,000. For profits between £250,000 
and £1.25 million, a tapering relief applies.
(continued)
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Characteristics of Foreign Tax Systems 
(continued)
If a company is part of a group, these limits are proportionately reduced by the num­
ber of group companies. Therefore, when a company is part of a large worldwide 
group, the small companies rate will no longer apply.
U: Generally, no. However, a refundable credit is available for foreign shareholders
if (and to the extent that) the German corporation distributes foreign-source 
income to its non-German shareholders.
V: A general deduction is applicable to both dividend and interest income. It is
not applicable to dividends received by shareholders holding more than 35 % in the 
distributing company. The avoir fiscal credit from dividends that are sheltered from 
tax by this deduction remains available for credit.
W: The basic rate of individual taxation is 25% and this rate determines the rate 
of advance corporation tax (ACT). There is a 20% rate applicable to the first £2,000 
of taxable income.
X: The general regime is to tax the gross dividend and give a credit for the avoir
fiscal. In the case of parent companies, 95 % of the subsidiary dividend is excluded 
from tax, and no avoir fiscal credit is allowed.
Y: Represents combined federal and typical provincial tax.
Z: The dividend is not grossed up by the amount o f the credit. A dividend credit
equal to 10% and 2.8% of the dividend received is allowed against the national and 
local taxes o f taxpayers with ordinary income o f less than ¥ 10 million. For taxpayers 
with ordinary income in excess of ¥ 10 million, the credits against national and local 
taxes are 5% and 1.4%.
AA: Unilateral relief by exemption (in respect o f nonportfolio [holdings exceeding
10 %] dividends received by Australian resident corporations) foreign tax credit, 
treaty relief by exclusion or rate reduction.
BB: Resident rates shown. Nonresident rates range from 29% to 47%.
CC: Relief is by way of credit to individual shareholder o f corporate tax paid.
Intercorporate dividends are subject to rebate. Dividends paid to nonresidents that 
carry franking credits (i.e., dividends that have been paid out of tax-paid profits and 
are declared to be such) are exempt from withholding tax.
DD: Tax rebate is available to public companies regardless o f the franked status
o f the dividend. However, tax rebate is only available in respect o f franked dividends 
(dividends paid out of tax-paid profits) received by private companies from non­
group companies. Tax rebate is available in respect o f unfranked dividends paid to 
a private company by a group company.
Table D.1
Individual Capital Gains:
Note 1: Canada. Canadian tax rules provide for a cumulative tax exemption for
capital gains up to a lifetime limit of C$100,000. Since three-quarters of capital gains
86
are included in income for tax purposes, the exemption effectively removes tax 
liability on C$25,000 of capital gains.
Note 2: France. Gains from the sale of land held for two years or less are taxed
at normal income tax rates. Gains from the disposal of land and buildings held 
for more than two years are adjusted for inflation and then reduced by a percentage 
for every year of ownership over two years. Exempt items include capital gains 
arising from the sale o f property from a total holding worth less than FF400,000 and 
from the sale of the principal residence. An annual allowance o f FF6,000 is 
deducted from gains otherwise chargeable. Gains on the sale o f stock and shares are 
taxable at 16% in specific cases.
Note 3: Germany. Long-term gains from the sale o f private assets are generally
not taxable. Gains realized on business assets and short-term gains from privately 
held securities sold within six months o f acquisition and from the sale of real 
property within two years of acquisition are subject to tax at normal rates. Gains 
from the sale o f securities and real property not exceeding DM1,000 in a tax year are 
exempt; losses may be set off against gains arising in the same year but cannot be 
carried forward or back. For individuals, capital gains from the disposal of shares in 
a corporation by a shareholder of 25% or more or from the sale of a partnership 
interest are subject to half the normal income tax rate.
Note 4: Italy. Gains arising from the sale of assets are generally not taxable for
individuals, except in specific cases provided for by the fiscal law, in which case the 
gain is taxable as ordinary income (i.e., sales of immovable property within five years 
of acquisition). An annual election is provided to compute tax on sales o f shares, 
quotas, convertible debentures, and option rights either at the rate of 25% of actual 
net gains or at the rate of 15% on presumed gains determined by applying specified 
indices to the sales proceeds.
Note 5: Japan. Personal capital gains are generally included in taxable income 
and taxed at normal rates. The taxpayer may deduct ¥500,000 annually from gains 
on the sale o f short-term assets (those held ten years or less). In the case of long­
term assets, half of the gain is taxable. Gains on the sale of securities are no longer 
tax-exempt. Capital gains derived from the transfer of real property are taxed at 
special rates after certain deductions.
Note 6: United Kingdom. Net gains exceeding £5,000 per year (after index relief)
are taxed as income at the individual's marginal rate. Private cars, principal private 
residences, government securities held for more than twelve months, and certain 
other assets and transactions are exempt. Losses may be carried forward 
indefinitely. Nonresidents are not normally subject to capital gains tax.
Note 7; Australia. Gains from the sale of cars and principal residences are 
exempt. Gains are taxed in year of disposal but may be averaged over five years to 
obtain a more favorable tax rate by taking advantage o f individual lower marginal tax 
rates in those years (averaging is achieved by dividing the amount of the capital gain 
by five, calculating the amount o f tax on that amount, and multiplying that amount 
o f tax by five).
(continued)
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Capital losses may only be offset against capital gains, but may be carried forward 
indefinitely.
Special rules apply to personal-use assets, including a threshold o f A$5,000 and 
limitations on the offset of losses.
Cost base o f assets used in calculating the gain is indexed for inflation, unless the 
asset is held for less than twelve months.
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Appendix E
Comparison of the 
Tax Integration Methods 
of Foreign Countries
This appendix includes a com parison o f  the tax integration methods 
adopted by Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany, 
and Australia. A separate calculation has been  perform ed for each country. 
These calculations show the com bined corporate and individual tax burden 
under the m ethod o f  integration for both a high-rate taxpayer and a low-rate 
taxpayer. These calculations are based on three different distribution levels.
[Tables begin on following page.]
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Table E.1 
Australia
Distribution Level
100% 50% 0%
Pretax Income 100.00 100.00 100.00
Corporate Tax @  39% (39.00) (39.00) (39.00)
Amount Available for Dividend 61.00 61.00 61.00
Dividend Paid (Net) 61.00 30.50 0.00
Franking Credit 39.00 19.50 0.00
Gross Dividend 100.00 50.00 0.00
High-Rate Taxpayer
Tax @  48.25% on gross dividend 48.25 24.13 0.00
Less: franking credit (39.00) (19.50) 0.00
Net individual tax 9.25 4.63 0.00
Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax 39.00 39.00 39.00
Net individual tax 9.25 4.63 0.00
Total tax 48.25 43.63 39.00
Low-Rate Taxpayer (resident)
Tax @  22.25% on gross dividend 22.25 11.13 0.00
Less: franking credit (See Note) (39.00) (19.50) 0.00
Net individual tax 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax 39.00 39.00 39.00
Net individual tax 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total tax 39.00 39.00 39.00
Note: Franking credit can offset tax on any other taxable income derived by the shareholder 
in the year.
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Table E.2 
Canada
Distribution Level
100% 50% 0%
Pretax Income 100.00 100.00 100.00
Corporate Tax @ 4 4 % (44.00) (44.00) (44.00)
Amount Available for Dividend 56.00 56.00 56.00
High-Rate Taxpayer
Dividend 56.00 28.00 0.00
Add: gross-up (25%) 14.00 7.00 0.00
Amount subject to tax 70.00 35.00 0.00
Tax before credit (@  46.4%) 32.48 16.24 0.00
Total dividend tax credit
(federal and provincial) (14.00) (7.00) 0.00
Net individual tax 18.48 9.24 0.00
Total Tax Burden
Corporate tax 44.00 44.00 44.00
Net individual tax 18.48 9.24 0.00
Total tax 62.48 53.24 44.00
Low-Rate Taxpayer
Dividend 56.00 28.00 0.00
Add: gross-up (25%) 14.00 7.00 0.00
Amount subject to tax 70.00 35.00 0.00
Tax before credit (@  26.35%) 18.45 9.22 0.00
Total dividend tax credit
(federal and provincial) (14.00) (7.00) 0.00
Net individual tax 4.45 2.22 0.00
Total Tax Burden
Corporate tax 44.00 44.00 44.00
Net individual tax 4.45 2.22 0.00
Total tax 48.45 46.22 44.00
Note: Since the provincial tax is a multiple of the federal tax after dividend tax credit in all 
provinces except Quebec, the provincial tax system is effectively integrated, and this schedule 
combines federal and typical provincial taxes.
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Table
France
Distribution Level
100% 50% 0%
Pretax Income 100.00 100.00 100.00
Corporate Tax @  34% (34.00) (34.00) (34.00)
Amount Available for Dividend 66.00 66.00 66.00
Dividend Paid (Net) 66.00 33.00 0.00
Avoir Fiscal 33.00 16.50 0.00
Gross Dividend 99.00 49.50 0.00
High-Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 56.8% on gross dividend 56.23 28.12 0.00
Less: avoir fiscal credit (33.00) (16.50) 0.00
Net individual tax 23.23 11.62 0.00
Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax 34.00 34.00 34.00
Net individual tax 23.23 11.62 0.00
Total tax 57.23 45.62 34.00
Low-Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 5% on gross dividend 4.95 2.47 0.00
Less: imputation credit (33.00) (16.50) 0.00
Net individual tax (refund) (28.05) (14.03) 0.00
Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax 34.00 34.00 34.00
Net individual tax (28.05) (14.03) 0.00
Total tax 5.95 19.92 34.00
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Table E.4 
Germany
Distribution Level
100% 50% 0%
Pretax Income* 100.00 100.00 100.00
Corporate Tax @  50% (50.00) (50.00) (50.00)
Tax reduction to 36% due to dividend 14.00 6.14 0.00
Net corporation tax (36.00) (43.86) (50.00)
Amount Available for Dividend 64.00 56.14 50.00
Dividend Paid (Net) 64.00 28.07 0.00
Imputation Credit 36.00 15.79 0.00
Gross Dividend 100.00 43.86 0.00
High-Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 53% on gross dividend 53.00 23.25 0.00
Less; imputation credit (36.00) (15.79) 0.00
Net individual tax 17.00 7.46 0.00
Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax 36.00 43.86 50.00
Net individual tax 17.00 7.46 0.00
Total tax 53.00 51.32 50.00
Low-Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 19% on gross dividend 19.00 8.33 0.00
Less: imputation credit (36.00) (15.79) 0.00
Net individual tax (refund) (17.00) (7.46) 0.00
Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax 36.00 43.86 50.00
Net individual tax (17.00) (7.46) 0.00
Total tax 19.00 36.40 50.00
*  After municipal trade tax—effective rate averages around 17%.
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Table E.5 
Italy
Distribution Level
100% 50% 0%
Pretax Income* 100.00 100.00 100.00
Corporate Tax @  36% on Taxable
Income of 104.83 (37.74) (37.74) (37.74)
Amount Available for Dividend 62.26 62.26 62.26
Dividend Paid (Net) 62.26 31.13 0.00
Imputation Credit 35.02 17.51 0.00
Gross Dividend 97.28 48.64 0.00
High-Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 50% on gross dividend 48.64 24.32 0.00
Less: imputation credit (35.02) (17.51) 0.00
Net individual tax 13.62 6.81 0.00
Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax 37.74 37.74 37.74
Net individual tax 13.62 6.81 0.00
Total tax 51.36 44.55 37.74
Low-Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 10% on gross dividend 9.73 4.86 0.00
Less: imputation credit (35.02) (17.51) 0.00
Net individual tax (refund) (25.29) (12.65) 0.00
Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax 37.74 37.74 37.74
Net individual tax (25.29) (12.65) 0.00
Total tax 12.45 25.09 37.74
*  After local tax at 16.20 % rate. For income earned after January 1 , 1991, only 75%  o f  the local 
tax is deductible. Accordingly, income before local tax o f  U9.33 is subject to local tax o f  19.33, 
but only 14.50 o f the local tax is deductible for national tax purposes. Proposed legislation 
introduced in September 1992 would make local income tax nondeductible for corporate tax, 
effective for calendar year 1992.
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Table E.6 
Japan
Distribution Level
100% 50% 0%
Pretax Income 100.00 100.00 100.00
National Tax (33.30%) (33.30) (33.30) (33.30)
Inhabitant Tax (6.89%) (6.89) (6.89) (6.89)
Enterprise Tax (11.19%) (11.19) (11.19) (11.19)
Total Tax (51.38) (51.38) (51.38)
Amount Available for Dividends 48.62 48.62 48.62
High-Rate Taxpayer
Gross dividend 48.62 24.31 0.00
National tax (50%) 24.31 12.16 0.00
Tax credit (5%) (2.43) (1.22) 0.00
Net national tax 21.88 10.94 0.00
Inhabitant tax (15%) 7.29 3.65 0.00
Tax credit (1.4%) (0.68) (0.34) 0.00
Net inhabitant tax 6.61 3.31 0.00
Net individual tax 28.49 14.25 0.00
Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax 51.38 51.38 51.38
Net individual tax 28.49 14.25 0.00
Total tax 79.87 65.73 51.38
Note: The capital amount is over ¥100 million.
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Table E.7 
United Kingdom
Distribution Level
100% 50% 0%
Pretax Income 100.00 100.00 100.00
Corporate Tax (Before ACT Credit) (33.00) (33.00) (33.00)
Amount Available for Dividend 67.00 67.00 67.00
Dividend paid (net) 67.00 33.50 0.00
ACT 22.33 11.17 0.00
Gross dividend 89.33 44.67 0.00
Corporation Tax 33.00 33.00 33.00
Less: ACT credit (22.33) (11.17) 0.00
Net corporation tax 10.67 21.83 33.00
High-Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 40% on gross dividend 35.73 17.87 0.00
Less: ACT credit (22.33) (11.17) 0.00
Net individual tax 13.40 6.70 0.00
Total Tax Burden
ACT 22.33 11.17 0.00
Net corporation tax 10.67 21.83 33.00
Net individual tax 13.40 6.70 0.00
Total tax 46.40 39.70 33.00
Low-Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 25% on gross dividend 22.33 11.17 0.00
Less: ACT credit (22.33) (11.17) 0.00
Net individual tax 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total Tax Burden
ACT 22.33 11.17 0.00
Net corporation tax 10.67 21.83 33.00
Net individual tax 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total tax 33.00 33.00 33.00
Note: For illustrative purposes, the low-rate taxpayer is assumed to be taxed at the 25% basic 
rate o f individual taxation since this is the rate that determines the level o f ACT.
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